A Discussion
for the Demonstration of Action (Karma-Siddhi-Prakarana) (ebook) With my warmest thanks to Vasubandhu and Stefan Anacker!
1. It is said in the sutras: "There are three kinds of acts: bodily acts, verbal acts, and mental acts."[2] On this point 2. Certain people (the Vaibhasikas) say: "The acts which are committed by the body are 'bodily acts'; speech itself is 'verbal action', and both of these singly constitute 'manifest and unmanifest action'.[3] Acts which are associated with manas[4] are 'mental actions', and they are equivalent to volitions." But this matter has to be investigated at this point. What is this event which is called "manifest action"? Vaibhasika: To begin with, a "manifest action of the body" is a configuration[5] which has arisen from a citta[6] which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it. V: Of what is it a configuration? Vaibhasika: It is a configuration of the body. V. If it is a configuration of the body, how can one call it an act which has been committed by the body? It is, after all, said to be an act committed by 'it. Vaibhasika: Since such an act (i.e. a bodily act) has reference to one part of the body in general, it is called "a configuration of the body", (i.e. a configuration of one part of the body, e.g. "a gesture of the hand"), and since it arises dependent upon the great elements[7] of the body in general, it is called "an act committed by the body". Verbal expressions which refer to things in general often also refer to their particular parts, as for instance when 'it is said "He lives in the village" or "He lives in the forest" (when what is meant is: "He lives in a house in the village" and "He lives under a tree in the forest"). V: What is the- purpose of saying that it "has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it"? Vaibhasika: Even though in speaking, there may arise a configuration of the lips, etc., this description is not appropriate for such a configuration, because it has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, but rather has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to words. And though there may be a configuration which has arisen from the citta of a former aspiration, this description is not appropriate for such a configuration, either, because it has not arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it, but rather has also arisen from another citta, which is a retributory cause.[8] V: Why is it called "manifest action"? Vaibhasika: Because it informs one of (or: manifests to one) a citta which is instigating action in another. "By the transformations of external motions, one is shown the intentions in living beings' hearts, as one is shown a fish living hidden in a lake, through the transformations of the waves." V: Well then, what is this which you call "configuration"? Vaibhasika: It is this: "length", etc. V: But what is "length", etc.? Vaibhasika: It is that by virtue of which cognitions such as "This is long ! This is short !" arise. V: To which sense-field does it belong? Vaibhasika: To the sense-field of visibles. 3. V: Now is configuration to be regarded as a special kind of atom, like color[9], as some special aggregation of atoms, or as some single entity pervading the aggregations of color-atoms, etc.? If it were a special kind of atom, "long", "short", etc., would have to be comprised separately in each part of the aggregate to which it belongs, just as color is. If, on the other hand, it were some special aggregation of atoms, what would be the difference between it and a special aggregation of color-atoms? It could be due to a special aggregation of these colors that "long", "short", etc., arise as cognitions. Moreover, if it were a single entity pervading the aggregation of color-atoms, then, because it would be single, and because it would pervade, it would have to be perceived separately in each part of the aggregation, because it would have to be in all of the parts at one time. Or else it would not be a single entity, because it would be constituted with various parts.[10] Furthermore, your basic doctrine which states that the first ten sense-fields are aggregations of atoms, would be invalidated by this view. And it would strengthen the doctrine of the school of Kanada, which states that composites exist as entities which penetrate their components.[11] 4. [12]When an aggregation of color appears in one direction in great quantity, it evokes the idea of "long". If it appears thus in only a small quantity, it evokes the idea of "short". When it appears equal in each of four sides, it evokes the idea of "square". If there is an equal distance everywhere from its circumference to its center, it evokes the idea of "circular". When a greater quantity of color appears amassed at its central portion, it evokes the idea of "convex", and when a smaller quantity appears there, it evokes the idea of "concave". When it appears to go along in one direction, it evokes the idea of "even", and when it appears to go along in various directions, it evokes the idea of "uneven". [cf. Kosa IV ad 3 c (LVP p. 10, 2nd arg.)]Though ideas of various configurations may arise when a variegated quilt appears in such a manner, yet following your theory these various kinds of configuration cannot logically be situated within one locus, just as, for example, various colors cannot. But if they could, the idea of every configuration could arise in reference to every locus, and this is also not the case. (On the other hand, one configuration for each locus is ruled out because one can construe various configurations in one section of an embroidered quilt.) This being so, there is no separate entity "configuration". We form ideas of "long", etc., when color, and nothing else, is situated in special loci. As for example we form ideas of new "entities" with regard to arrays of trees, birds, ants, etc. There seems to be no flaw in this reasoning. 5. Vaibhasika: If this is so, how is it that something is discernible at a long distance through an object-of-conscious- ness of its configuration, while it is not discernible through an object-of-consciousness of its color-aggregations? [Ibid, though the Kosa argument is not quite identical] V: Well, how is it that some things are discernible through an object-of-consciousness of the configurations of the arrays or groups to which they belong, while they are not discernible through an object-of-consciousness of their main own configuration? There is no further entity involved here. As a matter of fact, when we are confronted with something at a long distance, or in a dark cave, the object is undiscernible through objects-of-consciousness referring to either color or configuration, and we say, "What is this? I can only perceive it dimly. What are we seeing here?" Since this is so, it should be recognized that at this time, its color is not being clearly perceived, nothing more.[Kosa IV ad 3 c (LVP p. 11) develops the counter-argument in a slightly different manner.] (i.e. when its color is not clearly perceived, its "configuration" isn't, either.) For this reason, manifest action consisting of "configuration" cannot be demonstrated. 6. Certain other people (the Arya-Sammitiyas) say: "Manifest action is a movement which has arisen from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it." V: What is the purpose of saying that it arises from a citta which has an object-of-consciousness referring to it? Arya-Sammitiya: To exclude the movement of the lips, etc., which takes place in speaking. V: What is this which you call "movement"? Arya-Sammitiya: It is the progression (of a thing) to another locus. V: To which sense-field does it belong? Arya-Sammitiya: To the sense-field of visibles. 7. V: How do you know that there exists such a progression of the same thing to another locus? Arya-Sammitiya: Because there is no special differentiating characteristic which can be ascertained for the thing (i.e. any special characteristic which would distinguish the thing at locus A from the thing subsequently at locus E). V: But even though there is no special characteristic which can be ascertained for a product arising in a dyeing-process when it is removed immediately after conjoining with the conditions allowing it to arise in the process, i.e. fire, the sun, ice, plants, etc.,[13] yet this does not mean that the product is not something else than what has existed before. And though there is no special characteristic ascertained for different flames in contact with similar sections of tall grasses about to be burned, this does not mean that they are not different. Now if the sequence of products arising in the dyeing-process did not begin to arise immediately upon the conjoining of the thing being dyed with the conditions for dyeing, then it could not begin later, either, because there is no special characteristic changing within the conditions. And furthermore, if other flames did not also arise in some other sections of what is about to be burned, then, because of the special characteristics in the one section involved, there would not be any new special characteristic in the flame's extent, glare, or heat. For these reasons it is not logical to say that something must be the same thing that existed before, simply because no new special characteristic can be ascertained for it. 8. Arya-Sammitiya: Well, but there is such a progression, because there is no cause for the destruction (of the thing previously at locus A). V: What is the cause of destruction for things that are certainly momentary: cittas, events associated with cittas, sounds, etc., and flames? (These things have no causes for their destruction.) Similarly there may not be one for other things, either. [cf. Kosa IV ad 2b-3b(LVP p. 6, 4): "If one needed a cause for destruction, one would need one for every destruction."] Arya-Sammitiya: But these things do have a cause for their destruction: their own innate lack of duration. V: Why don't you similarly accept such a cause for other things, as well? Just as there is no other cause for these things, in the same way, there need be no other cause for these other things, either. Arya-Sammitiya: If there were none, then the materiality of wood, etc., would not be perceived even before its contact with fire, etc., just as it isn't after it. Or else, afterwards, it would be just as it was before. V: a. Now this is similar to the case where the flame of a lamp and the sound of a bell are both perceived before they are in contact with a gust of wind or a hand, respectively, but afterwards are not. Those two are not, however, destroyed because of these two (because different phases in the flame and the sound constantly displace each other, anyway, and finally lead to their own destruction even without the intervention of a gust of wind or a hand).[cf. Kosa IV 2b-3d (LVP pp. 5-6)] b. If the materiality of wood, etc., were no longer perceived because it is destroyed by fire, etc., itself, then it would be destroyed even when removed immediately after its simple contact with fire.[14] c. Though the external conditions for the products which arise in a dyeing-process remain undifferentiated, these various products arise through a gradual succession of causes first causing them to take on a special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic, then intensifying this special characteristic to a great degree. However, through what does the destruction of the previous characteristic come about? For it is not logical that something only through which a thing comes to be, also be the cause of the thing's not being there later. It is commonly known that the causes of two contradictory results cannot be one.[15] This being so, we must conclude that these previous characteristics are destroyed without a specific cause of destruction. [Ibid, IV ad 2b-3b, LVP p. 8.] That "something" is perceived or no longer perceived in the manner in which "it" was before, should be known as being due to the continuation of a series of momentary events without the intervention of any extraordinary special characteristics, and to the transformation of this series, respectively. d. If these things that are destroyed become destroyed possessed of a specific cause of destruction, then no cittas, events associated with cittas, etc., would become destroyed without such a cause, either. Just as, for example, they depend on a specific cause for their arising. On the other hand, an innate lack of duration in any way different from the events themselves cannot be demonstrated. e. There would be a special characteristic for it stemming from each of these special causes (if a special cause of destruction were necessary). Just as there are diverse products which arise in a dyeing-process from fire, the sun, ice, grasses, etc., respectively. f. Destruction would also be possessed of a cause, as are material substances. (An infinite regress would result.) This being so, there can be no special cause of destruction. 9. Arya-Sammitiya: Well, (the thing at locus B) is ascertained to be the same because there is no cause for the arising of anything else in this manner. V: But since there could be a cause for the arising of this subsequent thing, namely the preceding thing, there could be such a cause of arising. This would be like the cases where another citta arises from a citta, a different product in dyeing arises from a previous product, curds arise from milk, wine arises from the juice of grapes, and vinegar arises from wine.[16] If this were so, there would be nothing which could be called a true movement which has the characteristic of a progression of the same thing to another locus. 10. Moreover, when a thing is stable, it has no movement. And if it has no movement, it ,is constantly stable. (On the other hand, if it is not stable, it also has no movement[cf. Kosa IV ad 2b-3b, LVP pp. 4-5, on the second part of this argument.].) Arya-Sammitiya: If this is really so, what is it that appears in another locus (in those cases we construe as being movement of the same thing)? V: The same thing doesn't appear. Arya-Sammitiya: Well then what does? V: It is similar to the case where grass-fires or shadows appear in each locus as something new and something new again. The same shadow never appears in another locus. For (1) while that which is connected with it remains stationary, it appears to arise, to be obscured, and to change, because the sunlight is far away, near at hand, or changing; (2) as soon as a bright area is darkened in another place, a shadow appears. Our opponent may well object: "Though, if someone says that there is a progression consisting of the same thing moving to another locus, it may be argued, 'How do you arrive at this?'; if someone says that it is not the same thing moving to another locus [cf. Kosa IV ad 2b-3b, LVP pp. 4-5, on the second part of this argument.] one can equally argue, 'How do you arrive at this?'" The basis for this assumption is the very argument already given: "Moreover, when a thing is stable, it has no movement", etc. And there is this additional basis that even when the external conditions for products arising in dyeing are without variation, these products become something else from each moment to the next, a fact which can be ascertained through their subsequent special characteristics. Again, if you imagine a stable entity because there is no basis for its becoming something else, why not accept the theory that it does become something else, because there is also no basis for its being a stable entity? This being so, as it follows that nothing can be resolved regarding either alternative, all that has been shown here is that a progression cannot be demonstrated. 11. The Sauryodayikas [These are a group of Sautrantikas basing their theories on the treatise Suryodaya of Kumaralata.] say that though it is true that compounded events are without progression to another locus, because they are destroyed by their own-natures, yet there arises, in a hand, etc., a special event as a cause for something's arising in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing at the first locus, which event has a certain citta as its cause. It is (conventionally) called both "motion" and "manifest action". V: To which sense-field does it belong? Sauryodayika: To the sense-field of visibles. V: In that case, why isn't it seen by the eye, as color is? And if it isn't seen, how can it be a manifest action which informs others? Sauryodayika: If it does not exist in this manner, how can a body arise in another locus? V: It is through the wind-element which has arisen from a certain citta (that something arises in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing in the firs' locus). Sauryodayika: If this is so, what exactly is the cause for something's arising in another locus? V: It is the gaseousness of this same wind-element. Sauryodayika: How can it be the cause of this immediately subsequent arising in another locus in the case of grass and leaves? V: (In this case, "motion" occurs) because of wind-element, which causes a disturbance, causes a thrust, and which has conjoined with the grasses, etc. And furthermore, if it is admitted that it is the same thing from which motion is held to arise that causes something to arise in another locus immediately subsequent to a previous thing at the first locus, what use is there for an examination of a principle of motion which cannot be revealed by any possible object-of-consciousness?" II 12. Sauryodayika: In that case, is it that same special wind-element which has arisen from a special citta, and which is the cause for a body's arising in another locus, which is manifest action? V: How can something which does not have the capacity for informing others be manifest action? To hold that the sense-field of tactile sensations is either beneficial or unbeneficial is not the doctrine of the sons of Sakya. [cf. Kosa I, ad 29 c-d. "Sons of Sakya", i.e. sons and daughters of Sakyamuni, are the Buddhists.] [17a] Sauryodayika: In that case, is the body which arises in another locus through the special citta itself manifest action? V: If this were so, manifest action would be purely mentally constructed, and would not be a true entity, since there is no constituency as one entity as regards the body. And also, manifest action would become non-informing, because there is no informing of others of the intentions of living beings through the smell, etc., connected with a body. Furthermore, to hold that the sense-field of smell, etc., is beneficial or unbeneficial is not the doctrine of the sons of Sakya. Sauryodayika: In that case, is the color which arises from a special citta itself manifest action?[18] V: It does not arise from a special citta. Sauryodayika: In that case, how does it arise? V: It arises from its own seed, and from a special wind-element. To hold that color is beneficial or unbeneficial is also not the doctrine of the sons of Sakya, 13. Sauryodayika: If it is correct that color is not manifest action, is its arising in another locus manifest action? V: Beloved of the gods![19] Though it can be seen that you are making efforts to the best of your abilities, what is the point in making an effort towards things that can't be demonstrated by any effort whatsoever? Since this new supposed manifest action isn't seen, as visibles are, and as its force is also not an object which is seen, unlike in the case of an eye, etc.,[20] how is it possible to demonstrate its existence as something separate? It has already been stated that if it is not seen, it must be explained how it can be manifest action. If color could be beneficial and unbeneficial, then its arising could be so, too, but it has already been explained that color is not like this. This being so, it appears that there is no manifest action which could be bodily action. 14. Vaibhasika: Then is bodily action only an unmanifest action? V: What is this which you call "unmanifest action"? Vaibhasika: It is materiality belonging to the sense-field of mentally cognizables, consisting of restraint, etc. [cf. note 3] V: Then an unmanifest action taking place in the realm of desires would arise without there being a previous manifest action. Vaibhasika: If this is so, what is entailed? V: Unmanifest action would be subordinated to citta, as it is, for example, in the realm of simple images.[21] Accordingly, there could be neither restraint nor non-restraint in those who are joined with a different citta (i.e. a citta which itself had nothing to do with producing the unmanifest action), or in those who are without a citta (i.e. in an unconscious state). Vaibhasika: This is not so, because it is projected from a determined time by a previous manifest action. V: But how could there be a lie when there is no talk during a Pratimoksa recital? (At the confessional during the recital of the Pratimoksa of the monastic rules, if a monk remains silent and does not confess the misdeeds he has done, this constitutes a lie, a kind of unbeneficial action, even though in this case there has been no manifest action, either previously or at the time of the recital.) Now because unmanifest action is only of two kinds, it can never be indeterminate, and because unmanifest action is dependent, it cannot arise as a bodily act which is both beneficial and unbeneficial at the same moment.[22] 15. V: Though it is possible to imagine that bodily and verbal actions are material, their beneficiality and unbeneficiality is not demonstrated. And why is this? When the body has released the action, how can it be demonstrated as having a pleasant or unpleasant result at a later time, since it itself has entirely come to an end by that time? Certain people (the Vaibhasikas) say that a past act, through which a pleasant or unpleasant result comes about at some later time, also exists at that later time, so how can one say that an act's beneficiality and unbeneficiality is not demonstrated?[23] V: To say that a past act exists is a pustule arising on top of a boil.[24] The expression "past" designates something-that having existed in a former time, is subsequently no longer existing. Vaibhasika: In that case, how could it have been said by the Exalted One, "Even after hundreds of aeons, V: But what is the meaning of "do not perish"? It means that they are not without effects, as is shown by the latter half of the verse. It is not being stated here that acts also exist for a long time along with their effects. What is to be investigated is how they give their effects: whether this is through a special transformation of the series, as is the case with a seed of a rice-plant, or whether it is through a situation in their own-characteristic. If only a situation in their own-characteristic can give their effects, then it must be explained how they give their effects through not having been destroyed. Vaibhasika: It is not because of their non-existence as far as their own-characteristic is concerned, that they are said to be destroyed. V: On account of what is it then? Vaibhasika: On account of the fact that they do not exercise their full efficacy.[25] And how don't they exercise it? They don't project an effect. V: Why don't they project it? Vaibhasika: Because they have already completed projecting it, they are unable to project it again. Just as what has arisen does not arise again. 16-17. V: Why doesn't it project another effect similar to it?[26] As far as that goes, how does if project its effect at all? Vaibhasika: Because it prepares it for its arising. V: But the last state of one who has destroyed all distress does not project an effect,[27] and there is also the stoppage of an effect through any cessation not through contemplation.[28] Since from the beginning these cases do not exercise an efficacy, how can they later be destroyed? (i.e. Never exercising their efficacy, i.e. never projecting an effect, the last stage of one who has destroyed all distress and the last stage of an event-series before it undergoes cessation not through contemplation, are never really "present", given the Vaibhasikas' definition, and can thus never become "past".) Thus, the projecting of an effect for something with such a nature cannot be demonstrated. Vaibhasika: In that case, how is an effect projected? V: An effect is projected through the obtainment and development of the effect's "seed".[29] As according to your theory, a future thing also exists as an entity just as a past thing does, why doesn't it project an effect? If there were a constant existence for all entities, and nothing would cease to be because destroyed, would an effect ripen only if it obtained the necessary complex of conditions, as the verse says? At this point it should be demonstrated through what it is determined that the effect exists, and also what the force is which is operating in this case. (If an act ceases to project its effect as soon as it becomes past, but yet continues to exercise some sort of force, the problem lies with the determination of this force, as well as its final giving of a retributional effect). Thus, the existence of a past act which causes an effect to arise at a future time is not demonstrated. [cf. Kosa V ad 27.] 18. Opponent: In that case, it must be that a certain other event disassociated from citta arises in the aggregate-series, associated with beneficial and unbeneficial bodily and verbal acts. Some people (the Mahasanghikas) call it "the accumulation", others again (the Arya-Sammitiyas) call is "the imperishable". It is that through which a pleasant' or unpleasant effect is brought about at a future time. (This event must be posited also for mental acts.) If this other event did not arise in the citta-series, how could a mental act which has already disappeared, as another citta has arisen, bring about an effect? Without a doubt, this event must be accepted.[30] 19. V: In that case, when one has studied a text, .and after a long time has elapsed, a memory still arises regarding it, and memories arise in regard to other objects that have been seen, etc., what is the event through which this memory later arises for (this object) which has been studied or seen, etc.? And at what moment does it actually arise?[31] Also, as regards the citta which attains the attainment of the cessation of feelings arid cognitions, through what does the citta which emerges from this state later arise?[32] When a lemon flower is penetrated by the red of liquid lac, and it perishes along with it, what is the event through which there is later produced, within its fruit also, a red within its inner core?[33] 20. Thus, as there is no arising of this other event, which seems to be purely mentally constructed,[34] it should be known that, because a special force is produced within the citta-series by a volition, an effect arises at a later time through a special transformation within the series which has been penetrated (influenced) by this volition. Just as, for example, in the case of the lemon flower, it is through the whole series from flower to fruit being penetrated by the liquid lac that the inner core of the fruit arises as red.[35] 21. Vaibhasika: In this case, why is it that, as regards the citta-series, it is not accepted that it is penetrated (influenced) by bodily and verbal acts, also? Sautrantika: They become beneficial and unbeneficial in this way dependent upon cittas. Though it is logical that when something is rendered beneficial or unbeneficial by something, there be the force necessary for the same event to give a pleasant or unpleasant effect in the series with which it is associated; the series itself is not capable of doing so. (i.e. Though it is logical that when a bodily and verbal action is rendered beneficial or unbeneficial by a beneficial or unbeneficial volition, there be the force necessary for the bodily or verbal action to give a pleasant or unpleasant effect within the citta-series, the citta-series is of itself not capable of giving a pleasant or unpleasant result, and thus is not to be regarded as necessarily beneficial or unbeneficial.) In that case, if an effect arises at a later time because of a citta-series which has been penetrated (influenced) by an act endowed with this force, how is it that the effect of a former action arises for those who have interrupted the citta-series in the two meditational attainments that are without citta (the attainment free from cognitions and the attainment of the cessation of feelings and cognitions), or in a non-meditative state without cognitions? 22. Certain people (among the Sautrantikas) say that it is through the citta-series, which has been influenced by it, retaking its course at this very time. V: But how does it retake its course? Reply: It retakes its course because there is the citta which attains the meditational attainment, which serves as a directly antecedent condition.[36] V: But since a long time has elapsed since this citta has come to an end, how can it be a directly antecedent condition? There has already been the rebuttal that an effect does not arise from that which is past. So from where does that other citta (that emerges from the meditational attainment) arise? 23. Certain people (among the Sautrantikas) say that it is from its seeds which rest upon the material organs that this citta arises after the meditational attainment has been completed. The seeds of the cittas and events associated with cittas rest upon the citta-series or on the series of the material organs, or on both, depending on the case. [cf. Kosa II ad 44 d (LVP, p. 212).] V: But isn't it said [cf. Samyutta II, 72; IV, 33.] that mental consciousness arises dependent upon manas and a mentally cognizable? When there is no manas, how can it arise?[37] These "certain people" (among the Sautrantikas): It should be known that sometimes there is a metaphor of an effect for a cause, (i.e. the expression designating something's effect is employed metaphorically in place of the expression designating the cause.) So that one says "manas" for manas' seeds. (In this case, when "manas" is said, what is meant is the seeds that give rise to manas, which in our opinion rest upon the material organs during the attainment of the cessation of feelings and cognitions.) Just as, for example, one says "hunger" and "thirst" for a certain kind of tactile sensation (when really this tactile sensation is the effect of hunger and thirst). V: In that case, there would be two separate series of seeds for cittas and events associated with cittas, but this situation is not observed in things that naturally have seeds: sprouts, etc.[38] Though conditions for something may not be single, this is not the case with its seed. Furthermore, with this theory there only remains the flaw as to how the former actions of those who have interrupted the citta-series in the two meditational attainments without citta,[38a] or in a non-meditative state without cognitions, give their effects at a later time.[39] 24. Opponent: That flaw lies within the theory itself. V: In what theory? Opponent: In the view of those who say that these situations are without citta. Certain people accept the idea that these situations are endowed with citta. For instance, it is said by the Bhadanta Vasumitra in his Pariprccha[40]: "There is a flaw in the view of those who say that the attainment of cessation is without citta. In my view, the attainment of cessation is endowed with citta."[cf. Kosa II ad 44d (LVP, p. 212).] And there is also a basis for this view in a sutra, which says: "For him who has entered the attainment of cessation, bodily motivational dispositions are stopped, but the sense-organs are not and continue to function, and consciousness is not separated from the body." [cf. Majjhima I. 296. Motivational dispositions of the body: inhalation and exhalation. Motivational dispositions of speech: initial mental application and subsequent discursive thought. Motivational dispositions of manas: volition, cognitions, etc.] 25. V: What consciousness is held to exist for them at that time? Certain people say that it is a mental consciousness. V: [cf. Kosa II ad 44 d (LVP, pp. 212-213).] But hasn't it been said by the Exalted One that a mental consciousness arises dependent upon manas and mentally cognizables, and that at the same time there must exist a contact consisting of the conjunction of the three, along with simultaneously arising feelings, cognitions, and volitions? [Samyutta II 2; 13, 14. ***Ibid. Ill, 96.] And how can there be a conjunction of the three without contact? And how can there be contact without feelings and cognitions? And this in a state which is called "the attainment of the cessation of cognitions and feelings".[41] Certain people say that though the Exalted One said that craving is conditioned by feelings, yet not all feelings are conditions for craving. So in the same way, contact is not always a condition for feelings.[42] V: But these have been clearly differentiated by the Exalted One in other passages, for he says: "Craving arises dependent upon the feelings that arise from a contact accompanied by ignorance."*** But contacts themselves have not been differentiated anywhere. Thus, because there is no such special differentiation within contacts, what is said by you is no rebuttal. 26. The adversaries say that when the meeting (of manas, mentally cognizable, and mental consciousness) is endowed with a special force giving rise to contact, then it is called a "conjunction". At this time, however, the meeting of the three is without any force, as this force has been forfeited because of the attainment (of the cessation of feelings and cognitions). For this reason, as there is no contact at this time, how could there be cognitions and feelings? For this reason, only a mental consciousness remains in this state, (i.e. The attainment of cessation is a state where there exists a mental consciousness without the force to enter into real contact with mentally cognizables, and thus powerless to help give rise to feelings and cognitions.) V: In that case, of what sort is it? Is it beneficial, or afflicted, or unobstructed-indeterminate?[43] Opponent: What is implied by this? 27. V: If it is beneficial, how can it be beneficial without being conjoined with the roots of the beneficial: lack of greed, etc.? When there is lack of greed, etc., can it be that there is no contact?[44] Opponent: What if it is beneficial because it has been projected by a directly antecedent condition, which is beneficial? [cf. Kosa II ad 43 a (LVP, p. 203); Mahayanasangrahabhasya ad I, 54, (Tokyo vol. 112, p 282, 2-4)] V: But this is not sufficient to guarantee the beneficiality of anything, because immediately subsequent to something beneficial, there may arise cittas of all three kinds (beneficial, unbeneficial, indeterminate), and because when there is a citta which has beneficiality, which has been projected by the power of the roots of the beneficial, it is not appropriate that there be a cause for these roots to be removed, (thus it cannot be beneficial), and its being unbeneficial' leads similarly to an absurdity. The attainment of cessation is beneficial in the same way that final cessation is.[44a] If it were afflicted, how could it be afflicted without being conjoined with afflictions? When there are afflictions, how can it be that there is no contact? Thus it was said by the Exalted One in the Sutra of the Ten Questions:[45] "Any possible aggregate of feelings, aggregate of cognitions, or aggregate of motivating dispositions, arises dependent upon contact."[46] Furthermore, if it is not accepted that the meditational attainment free from cognitions is afflicted,, how much the more so in the case of the attainment of cessation.[47] Now as to its being unobstructed-indeterminate, is it the result of retribution, or is it related to bodily postures, related to artistic activity, or to magical creations [48] Opponent: What is entailed by this? 28. V: If it is supposed that it is the result of retribution, how could a retributional citta, which is necessarily of the realm of desires, become manifest immediately after a citta which has entered into the attainment of the summit of existence (i.e. the meditational state which is neither cognitional nor non-cognitional), as such a citta has already been severed for eight successive other meditational stages?[49] How would the absurdity not ensue that the attainment of cessation also belongs to the realm of desires? And how could a citta of utter non-agitation, etc., be manifest immediately after this attainment?[50] Thus it has been said in the Mahakausthila-sutra [cf. Digha III, 217; Samyutta II, 82; Majjhima II, 254, 262.]: "When one has emerged from the attainment of cessation, the contacts which one reaches are three, Mahakausthila: they are contact with utter non-agitation, with nothing whatever, and with the signless." Supposing that this mental consciousness were a retributional citta projected by former actions, what is the reasoning here which would ensure that for those who have entered the attainment of cessation, it would not have been transcended at the period of emergence, as it was engendered by a former volition? Indeed, how is it that when the citta of the attainment of the summit of existence, which has cessation as its object-of-consciousness, has come to an end, there should be obtained, because it is demonstrated as being present in the following attainment of cessation, the continuation of a retributional citta, which has latent impressions of the past, and belongs to the realm of desires, when such a citta has not been arising for a long time previously? And, indeed, why would a retributional citta retake its course when retributional materiality, being severed there, does not retake its course? (Afflicted retributional materiality is gotten rid of by these highest meditations [cf. Digha III, 211; Samyutta IV, 201.]; it follows - that a retributional citta which is susceptible to being connected with afflictions, would also be severed at this time.) 29. Now as to the theory that it could be related to bodily postures, etc., can there be a citta at this time which has as its object-of-consciousness a bodily posture, etc.? How can such a citta be formed, when there is no contact? Because it is held that the nine attainments of successive stages and the eight deliverances[51] are beneficial, it is not logical that there be an afflicted, or indeterminate, citta at hand at this time.[52] The attainment of the cessation of cognitions and feelings occurs dependent upon the attainment of the summit of existence, where there has been a mental attention, associated with tranquility, directed at such cessation. Thus it is said in the Mahakausthila-sutra in reference to the attainment of cessation: "The causes and conditions for a signless attainment are two, Mahakausthila: an absence of mental attention to any signs, and a mental attention to the signless." V: If there is a mental consciousness for those who have attained the cessation of cognitions and feelings, what is its object-of-consciousness, and what is its aspect? Opponent: What if it had cessation as its object-of-consciousness, and tranquility as its aspect? V: In that case, wouldn't it be beneficial? And being beneficial wouldn't it be conjoined with lack of greed, etc.? And if it were thus conjoined, wouldn't there be scope for the condition for contact? Opponent: What if it had some other object-of-consciousness and aspect? V: How would it be logical that the citta immediately after the citta which attains the attainment of cessation, be distracted? Because of these same two previously given arguments, this other additional indeterminate kind of citta constructed by the opponents themselves, is also contrary to fact. Accordingly, since you dialecticiansS2a do not understand things according to the intent of the scriptures, your understanding that there is a citta which is a mental consciousness within the states of the attainment of cessation, etc., is thought out in unheeding rashness. 30. Opponent: In that case, how is it to be held that the attainment of cessation is endowed with citta? V: In the manner in which certain Sautrantikas hold it. Opponent: In what manner do these certain Sautrantikas hold it? V: (There is a special retributory consciousness.) As this retributory consciousness, which contains all the seeds coloring future perceptions, etc., continues in a stream, once it has arisen after conception in the womb, and takes on various forms because of various retributory causes, without any interruption until the limit of Nirvana, this consciousness is not severed at this time. On this account, this state is called "endowed with citta". But the group of remaining six consciousnesses does not continue there, because their seeds have been impaired for a short time by force of the citta which enters the attainment of cessation, etc. On this account, this state is called "without citta."[53] 31. Citta has two aspects: the first accumulates (cinoti) seeds; the second is manifold (citra) on account of having various objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and special differentiating characteristics.[on the etymologies, cf. Teaching of the Three Own-Beings, v. 7; Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p. 71.] The state is said to be without citta because there is a deficiency of the second kind there, just as, for example, one calls a chair that has only one leg, "legless". 32. The state which impairs the seeds gradually becomes weak, weaker, and even more weak, in the same manner as there is a gradual diminution of boiling water, or in the velocity of a projected arrow, and because of this, when at the time of the emergence from the attainment, the conclusion of the projection is reached, due to a special transformation in the retributory consciousness from one moment to the next, and through the resumption of the seeds, the mental consciousness, and subsequently the other consciousnesses, also, arise as their conditions have renewed themselves. The retributory consciousness, which is only the various kinds of seeds themselves, is influenced by the other beneficial and unbeneficial events arising together with the consciousnesses different from it, by means of their augmentation of these seeds, according to circumstances. In accordance with the force of this special trans formation of the series, the process of impression resumes, and desired and undesired effects are brought about.[54] In reference to this, it has been said: "This citta which has limitless
seeds continues in a stream, Regarding this also, it was said by the Exalted One in the Mahayana sutra named Sandhinirmocana: "The appropriating consciousness,
profound and subtle, 33. It is also called "the appropriating consciousness", be cause it appropriates a body for the factors at the time of conception in the womb during the time of re-birth.[cf. Mahayanasangraha I, 5, pp 14-15; 1,35, p. 5.] Because it becomes the support of the seeds of all experienced events, it is called "the store-consciousness". Because it is the retribution for former acts, it is called "the retributory consciousness". 34. Furthermore, if it is not accepted, then by what consciousness is the body appropriated? There is no other consciousness apart from it which does not leave the body for life's duration, or which remains pervading it. And where do the residues of afflictions reside when they are removed by their antidotes? If it is said that it is within the same citta which is their antidote, how could it be appropriate that it be the anti dote, since it would be conjoined with the residues of afflictions?[57] For those who, born into the imageless realm, possess a citta-series which is afflicted, beneficial, or not liable to affliction, though their bodies consist of certain retributional entities collected by their particular life-course (i.e. being born in the imageless realm), their life-course itself would not be retribution nor connected with retribution if there were no special retributory consciousness. When Non-returners[58], at the summit of existence, are engaged in putting an end to all distress, and they manifest a citta without distress which belongs to the stage of nothing whatever, through what is it that they don't fall away to death? Taking part in an organism and life-force (which are employed by the Vaibhasikas to explain the absence of death in these highest meditational states) are not entities which are apart, because they are only metaphors for the similarity and perpetuation of retributory aggregates. [cf. A Discussion of the Five Aggregates, pp. 70-71.] Just as there are no separate entities of similarity and continuity in the case of the similarity and continuity of seedlings of fruit, etc. Accordingly, without a doubt, another consciousness of the type that has been described, must be accepted. 35. The honorable Tamraparniyas[59] recognize this same consciousness, calling it the consciousness which is the requisite for existence.[60] Others again (the Mahasanghikas) call it the "root-consciousness". 36. Opponent: In that case, what is its object-of-conscious- ness, and what is its aspect? V: Its object-of-consciousness and aspect are undiscerned. Opponent: How can it be a consciousness and be like this? V: The adversaries who claim that there exists a consciousness in the states of the attainment of cessation, etc., will have to agree to this, too. Opponent: In that case, in what appropriating aggregate is it included? V: Following the literal meaning of the term, it would be included within the appropriating aggregate of consciousness. 37. Opponent: In that case, how can one explain the statement of the sutra which says: "What is the appropriating aggregate of consciousness? It is the collection of six conscious nesses" [cf. Majjhima I, 53.], and "In the statement 'The psycho-physical complex comes about through the condition consciousness', what is consciousness? It is the collection of six consciousnesses." [Samyutta III, 60.]? V: It must be recognized that these passages have an intention. Just as, in the passage "What is the aggregate of motivating dispositions? It is the six classes of volition", this is not to say that other events are also not included there. [cf. Kosa I ad 15a-b.] Opponent: What is the intention in this? V: Now this has been stated by the Exalted One himself in the Sandhinirmocana-sutra: "It has not been taught by me
to fools, Opponent: Why would they imagine it to be such? V: Because its aspect is without fundamental changes as long as Samsara lasts. The intention there was to indicate only those consciousnesses which are less subtle, on account of their substrata, objects-of-consciousness, aspects, and special differentiating characteristics being easily delimited, in which the processes of affliction and alleviation are determined, on account of their being connected with both afflictions and their antidotes, and through which, being its effects, the consciousness relating to their seeds can be inferred, but not to indicate the cause-consciousness, because it is opposite from those other consciousnesses as regards these features.[61] In regard to this matter, it can be replied that the consciousness which is the requisite of existence can be indicated suitably as being the collection of six consciousnesses itself. It has also been demonstrated in the Vyakhyayukti that nowadays not all sutras are extant. Thus even if in the extant sutras it is not mentioned explicitly, this does not mean that the store-consciousness is not to be accepted.[62] 38. Opponent: Now if it is thus as you say, then there would be two consciousness-series simultaneously: the retributional consciousness-series, and the other. V: If this is so, what flaw is incurred? Opponent: A body which has two consciousness-series must be regarded as two sentient beings existing separately simultaneously, as, for instance, a second consciousness-series in another body is. V: This is not so, because of the admission that the two are not different as regards the being of their cause and effect, and because the retributional consciousness is influenced by the other consciousnesses. In the case of two consciousness-series belonging to different bodies, this state of affairs does not exist. Accordingly, this flaw does not occur.[63] 39. Opponent: Isn't there sometimes a difference to be seen between the series of the seed and the series which has the seed? (At the time when the result of the seed can be seen, i.e. the fruit, the original seed is no longer seen.) V: In the case of a blue lotus, etc., the roots and the things possessed of the roots cause both be seen simultaneously.[64] Thus, if it is seen, it is appropriate, and if it is not seen, it is also appropriate. If it is not accepted in the way that we describe it, then the absurdities ensue as we have described them. Thus, without a doubt, the store-consciousness must be accepted. 40. Opponent: In that case, why not accept a self with existence as an entity, as the substratum of the six consciousnesses?[65] V: In what way is a self accepted? If it presents itself only as a series of moment-events, and transforms itself constantly through conditions, then what is the difference between it and that store-consciousness? Opponent: But it is single and constantly devoid of transformations. V: In that case, how can it be demonstrated that it is also influenced by the latent impressions left in it by the consciousnesses, etc.? It is the latent impressions which produce the special forces which make the consciousness-series continue, just as a lemon flower is penetrated by liquid lac. If there is no special characteristic which undergoes transformation, how, as there are no impressions possible in such a case, do there arise in time special memories, recognitions, passions, etc., from special familiar former experiences, cognitions, and passions, etc.? As this self would exist in those states that are without citta, through what would it be that a mental consciousness later arises at the culmination of the state, as there are no special characteristics undergoing transformations within the self? In what way are the consciousnesses subject to it, through which it could be understood that the self is their substratum? If the arising of the consciousnesses is subject to the self, why do they arise gradually, as there are "no special transformations within the self"? If it is that they are dependent upon other auxiliary causes, why should these causes be acknowledged at all, since the force for making these consciousnesses arise lies according to you in something quite apart from them? Now it may be claimed that their stability is subject to it. But what sort of stability is there for things that cease to abide as soon as they have arisen, and which cannot be attained? Accordingly, such an entity (which is stable, unchanging, etc.) cannot be accepted as their substratum. And in this way (i.e. if the theory of a self were upheld), there would be a violation of scriptural authority, as it is said: "All events are without a self". [cf. Majjhima I, 138 II, 263 etc, etc.] Accordingly, the conception that there exists a lasting independent entity "self", is a poor one. Thus, these effects seem to arise at a later time by the store consciousness being influenced by certain volitions. But thus it can also be demonstrated that bodily and verbal actions are not possessed of the characteristics which have been described for them. 41. Opponent: If bodily and verbal actions are not accept ed in that manner (i.e. in the Vaibhasika manner, where a bodily act is defined as an act committed by the body, etc.), is it possible to deny the statement of the sutra, which states that there are three kinds of acts? V: It is not possible. But it is possible to explain all this in. such a manner that no flaw exists. Opponent: How will there not be a flaw? V: It is our purpose to explain why it has been taught that there are three kinds of acts, what a body is, what an act is, in what sense one can speak of "body" and "action" and "bodily action". Similarly, it is our purpose to state this also in regard to verbal and mental acts, and as to why only bodily acts, etc., have been spoken of, and not acts of the eye, etc. 42. To begin with, why has this been taught in this manner? In order to summarise the ten paths of action (the taking of life, taking what has not been given, offenses of lust, abandonment of the taking of life, abandonment of taking what has not been given; false speech, slander, harsh speech, idle talk, the abandonment of false speech, the abandonment of slander, the abandonment of harsh speech, and the abandonment of idle talk; covetousness, malice, wrong views, the abandonment of covetousness, the abandonment of malice, the abandonment of wrong views) with three kinds of action for those who would become frightened by the many things to be done, just as the three trainings were taught to Vrjiputraka. [Anguttara I, 130.] [65a] Certain people (the Tirthankaras)[66] say that only the actions committed by the body truly exist, and that verbal and mental acts both do not exist, because they are only discriminations, and it was also to explain to them that those two are also action that the three kinds of acts were taught in this manner. 43. The body is a special collection of great material elements and events derived from the great material elements, a corporeal mass associated with sense faculties. Action is a special volition. (Thus bodily action is actually a volition directed towards the body.) 44. A body exists in the sense that an accumulation exists, for it is an accumulation of atoms of great material elements, and atoms of that which is derived from the great material elements. Certain people say that it exists only in the sense of an accumulation of defilements, because the body is a well of unclear elements. But following the view of these people, there could be, for example, no bodies for gods. 45. An act is an intentional impulse in an "agent's" manas. 46. An act which sets the body into agitation is called a "bodily act". There are three kinds of volitions: those which pre pare, those which decide, and those which "set into agitation". Those that "set into agitation" are those which are called "bodily action", as it is they through which there is brought about the motile element (wind, gaseousness) which is the cause for the arising in another locus on the part of the series which is associated with it. It is called "bodily action" because the middle phrase has been omitted, just as one speaks of "medicinal bald-oil"[67], or of a "dust wind" (when what is really meant is "the medicinal oil prepared from the bald-plant" and "a wind which raises dust"). Opponent: But as three divisions of the paths of action, namely: the taking of life, the taking of what has not been given, and offenses of lust, are admitted to be bodily action, how can this term refer to a volition? V: Because this killing and taking and offenses take place because of it. That which has been committed by a bodily series engendered by it is said to be committed by it (i.e. that which is committed by a bodily series impelled by a volition, is said to be committed by that volition). Just as one says "a village burned by thieves" and "rice cooked with grass" (for a village which has been burned by a fire kindled by thieves, and for rice which has been cooked by fire arising from grass). Opponent: How can a volition be called a path of action? V: Though it is also simply action, it is also a path of action as it is the path which leads to the two kinds of courses: favorable and unfavorable. Or, if you will, the path of action is the agitation of the body, since the three kinds of action we have called "volition" evolve dependent upon it. 47. It is as a favor to worldlings that these are also described as bodily action. Though there is nothing beneficial or unbeneficial within them, they are thus designated metaphorically, because by that means the world will undertake resorting to, and abandoning, certain volitions. Opponent: If only volition is beneficial and unbeneficial action, how is it that it is said in the sutras [cf. Anguttara V, 297 ff; Madhyamagama Taisho 1, p 437 b 25-438 a 23; Karmaprajnapti Tokyo vol. 115, pp 85: (the very beginning of the Karmaprajnapti), which quotes this sutra.]: "There is a threefold action which when committed by the body after having been intended, is accumulated as unbeneficial, giving rise to suffering, and having suffering as its retribution."?[Ibid.] V: The intention was to speak of volition's medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness. The volition which is different from those volitions having a medium, substratum, and object-of-consciousness in the body or voice, is called "mental action", because it is associated with manas, and because it does not incite the body or voice. Opponent: If this is so, how is it that the Exalted One has spoken of "volition" and "the act which is committed after having willed"?[Ibid.] V: Among the three kinds of volition which we have indicated previously, it is the third which is called "act committed after having willed", since the body, etc., is incited by it after this has been willed by the first two kinds of volitions. 48. "Speech" means "words", i.e. those special vocal emissions which communicate meanings. Verbal action is that volition which brings forth these utterances. Something is speech because it is certain sorts of syllable?, or inasmuch as it expresses a desired meaning. [cf. Kosa II, ad 47, (LVP, p. 238)] Just as before, the action is the action which originates speech, because, just as before, the middle phrase has been omitted. 49. Consciousness is manas. It is manas because it produces a sense of "mine", and because it becomes intent on other "births" and objects-of-sense. The rest is to be explained just as before. Opponent: If only volition is bodily action, how can there be either restraint, or absence of restraint in those who are of distracted citta, or without citta, as there is no volition in these states? V: Because the impressions left by special volitions have not been suppressed, both restraint and the absence of restraint may exist in these states. The term "special" refers to that special volition which can be examined as originating the unmanifest action "restraint" and "absence of restraint". Opponent: What is the suppression of these impressions? V: As has been acknowledged, this suppression is the being of any cause for a volition of either abandonment or non-abandonment of the unbeneficial paths of action. Opponent: Through what does this suppression occur? V: It occurs through whatever volition can be examined as originating a manifest action which is the cause for the abandoning of restraint and its non-arising, and through any other causes of abandoning different from that. 50. Actions of the eye, etc., are not spoken of in the sutras by the Exalted One, because he wanted to speak only of those acts connected with an effort, and not simple acts of performance.[68] Opponent: What is an act connected with an effort? V: Anything which motivates "the agent's" manas. Opponent: What is a simple act of performance? V: Wherever there is simply the distinct energy of the eye, etc., there is a simple act of performance. Having explained the three kinds of
acts which were [1] See p. 58. [2] Action and its threefold division. The threefold division of action into bodily, verbal, and mental act occurs in fully-developed form already in various suttas of the Pali Nikayas (notably Digha III, 191, 245, and 279; Majjhima I 415-420; Anguttara I 32, 104, and 201). The germs for such a division can be seen in some of the earliest Buddhist writings, where the monk is implored to guard himself in body, speech, and mental activity (Sutta-nipata 330, 365; Dhammapada 231-234, 281, 361, 391). Sometimes in the suttas there are mentioned only two kinds of activity, e.g. at various passages where guarding body and speech are referred to only (Majjhima I, 461; Samyutta I, 182). But the triple division is taken for granted in both early Theravada and Sarvastivada Abhidharma (Dhammasangani 981; Bareau, Sectes—Sarvastivada thesis no. 117, p. 150) as well as in other Abhidharma traditions (e.g. the Mahisasaka (?) Sariputrabhidharmasastra, Taisho 1548, cf. Bareau, p. 198, thesis no. 42). It is a natural enough division for a school of thought that holds that intentions themselves determine the ethical nature of an act, though the specific interpretation of what it includes differs radically among Buddhist ethical theorists. It must be kept in mind that when Vasubandhu, and his Vaibhasika opponents, speak of "action" (karma), they mean an activity which can be subsumed under one or another of the retributional categories: unbeneficial (akusala), beneficial (kusala), and indeterminate (avyakrta).[see page 55.] That is, they either have, for the "agent", a consequence of suffering, or freedom from suffering, or are volitional but devoid of a definite consequence. By no means all activity (Sumatisfla's "karana") is action in this technical sense. [3] Vijnapti and avijnapti: Manifest and unmanifest action A "vijnapti" (lit. "an announcement", "communication", "intimation", but also in Vasubandhu's later usage "a perception") is an act which is manifestly perceptible to others besides the agent. A "manifest action" of the body is thus any action which can be seen by another, such as a gesture, etc.; a "manifest action" of speech is the actual closing and opening of the lips perceptible by the visual consciousness, and the result of which is perceived by the audial consciousness. "Avijnapti", on the other hand, is a peculiarly Vaibhasika term involving some difficulties. An avijnapti is always preceded by a manifest action (see Kosa I, ad 13-14c), and represents a subtle continuation which the action proper, the manifest action, has initiated. It may arise even when the agent is not conscious. Initially dependent on a conscious manifest action or a mental action, it represents a residual force which has as its locus the material elements of the agent's organism. It is itself regarded as material for this reason (Kosa I, ad 13-14, LVP, p. 20), though it is exempt from the usual characteristics of materiality, inasmuch as it is not directly perceptible, and does not exercise physical resistance. To clarify this somewhat difficult concept, one may take recourse to an example employed by both La Vallee Poussin (Kosa IV, p 3, n. 2, 2) and Gokhale ("What is avijnapti-rupa?", New Indian Antiquary I, 1938, p 69) in their explanations of the term: A man orders another man to commit a murder, and in so doing commits a manifest verbal action. The assassin in turn, at the time of the murder, commits a manifest bodily action. When the murder is committed, the instigator himself becomes guilty of the crime, though he may not be committing any manifest action at the time, and may in fact be asleep. To the Vaibhasika, there must be a real entity present to account for his acquiring the retribution of a murderer, and this is supplied by positing an "unmanifest action", which arises as soon as the crime is committed, but which can be traced back to the verbal action and volition which instigated it. Unmanifest actions are divided into three general types: those which can be characterized as "restraint"(samvara), as "lack of restraint"(asamvara), and as neither one nor the other (Kosa IV, ad 13a-b, LVP, p. 43). Our murder would belong actually to the third type, which is described as any unbeneficial or beneficial act which can be comprised neither within manifest action, mental action, nor within the restraint of disciplinary rules, meditation, and the holy man's path, nor within their reversal (Kosa IV, ad 37c-d, LVP, pp. 93-94). According to the Vaibhasikas, the beneficiality of the higher meditational states, where there is no more possibility of manifest action or volition, is due to the avijnapti of restraint resulting from the initial act of entering into meditation. A monk's keeping silent at the confession of misdeeds during the recital of the Pratimoksa would similarly be an unmanifest action of lack of restraint, if he has committed misdeeds, as again no manifest or mental action may be present during his silence. "Avijnapti", by the way, is not really analogous to the psychoanalytic concept of "unconscious act", since a conscious act must always precede its emergence. Nor should it be considered the mechanism of any retribution, as this is taken care of in other ways by the Vaibhasika, and avijnapti arises only as a result of certain acts, not all. (On this, see the article by Yamada, "On the idea of avijnapti-karma", IBK 10, 1962, pp. 51-55.) Vasubandhu defined unmanifest action (Kosa I, 11) only to subsequently refute it as a real entity (Kosa IV, ad 3d). His definition came under the attack of Sanghabhadra in his Abhidharmasamayapradipika, and resulted in Vasubandhu's revision of his definition in A Discussion of the Five Aggregates. (On this, see the notes of La Vallee Poussin and Gokhale.) Arguments against unmanifest action are found also in this treatise. [4] On manas, see pp. 60-61. [5] Samsthana, "configuration". To the Vaibhasika, the visible is divided into two aspects: color and "samsthana". (See Kosa I, ad l0a.) These two are considered distinct sense-impressions, and are thus for the Vaibhasikas two separate sorts of real entities (dravya, see note 5a). "Samsthana" is usually divided into eight general categories: "long", "short", "quadrangular", "circular", "convex", "concave", "even" or "straight", and "uneven" or "crooked". (On the translations of these terms, see note 12.) The omission of triangles may rest on the fact that they can be derived from quadrangulars. "Samsthana" can thus be rendered as "shape". The only reason the translation "configuration" is employed here is because "samsthana" is either a shape that appears stable to the visual consciousness, or one which is undergoing changes. It is to this second kind of "samsthana" that the Vaibhasika reduces manifest bodily actions. For example, we say that we see a man moving his arm, but what we actually see, the Vaibhasika says, is certain combinations of visual shapes undergoing changes. Apparently manifest bodily actions, to be truly manifest, have to be seen, since they can only be inferred by a blind man. Of course, one's own bodily actions are directly manifest to oneself, but the defining characteristic of manifest action is that it should be manifest to another. As it is being used here, the word "configuration" means both a shape and any combination of shapes, changing or unchanging. [5a] Dravya. The Vaibhasika criteria for considering something a real entity, or dravya, are: (1) Its characteristic must be distinguished as special by at least one consciousness (Kosa I, ad l0d) (a characteristic of this sort is called a "svalaksana", "own-characteristic") (2) It must not be susceptible to further division (Ibid, and Kosa VI, 4). True entities would thus to the Vaibhasika be only the moment-atoms of materiality and the momentary flashes of feelings, motivating dispositions, cognitions, and consciousness-perceptions. A body, a flame, and, for that matter, a consciousness-series, can thus not really be considered a dravya. (cf. Vibhasa, MCB V, pp 128-129; Sahghabhadra's Abhidharmanyayanusara chapt. 51, tr. LVP, MCB V, p. 106.) A dravya has a specific manner of being, or nature (its "own-being", svabhava) which is apprehended by one or another of the consciousnesses, or a combination of several, as an "own-characteristic". A change in characteristics is always a change in things: there are in fact no underlying entities which have characteristics—there is only whatever is presented to the consciousnesses themselves. In this connection, the Vibhasa makes much of its distinction between two levels of reality. First, there is common-sense reality, conventional reality (samvrti-satya), sometimes called "truth of designation" (prajnapti-satya), which speaks of "people" as people, "jars" as jars, and, even more remotely from any true dravyas, "nations" as nations, "armies" as armies, etc. Then there is ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), which has as its object the true svalaksanas of true dravyas. Actually, one could very well say [Vasubandhu in fact does something of the sort at Kosa II, ad 22.] that the Vibhasa really distinguishes three levels, because it categorizes all events into 75 basic types of dravyas, constituents which even in the last analysis work in a certain way. This is not quite the same as paramartha-satya, since it subsumes true dravyas, the momentary entities, into various broader categories. We might for convenience's sake call this level "dravyasatya", though this term is usually used by the Vibhasa as a synonym for "paramarthasat. At least one of the philosophers held in great esteem by the Vibhasa, namely the Bhadanta Vasumitra, had come to an interesting conclusion regarding paramarthasatya. He held that all designations are only prajnaptisat, but that underlying each designation there is some complex of moments which are paramarthasat but in their true state hopelessly elusive to those who rely on discursive thought alone, and characterizable only by the most general of designations (such as "being in the state of having causes and conditions") (Vibhasa, quoting the Bhadanta Vasumitra, MCB V, pp 166-167). And the Vibhasa itself, in one of its "options", went so far as to say that it was possible to hold that there is only one theory regarding conditioned events which can be ultimately true, i.e. "All things are empty and devoid of self." (Vibhasa, MCBV, p. 164). This is, of course, the opinion of Nagarjuna as well as, ultimately, the opinion of Vasubandhu himself (See the Commentary on the Separation from Extremes, and the Teaching of the Three Own-Beings included in this volume). Later Vaibhasikas seem to have lost sight of the Bhadanta Vasumitra's word of caution. Evidence for this is to be found not only in Vasubandhu's critiques of their theories (which after all may have been hardened into more rigid shape by Vasubandhu himself, in order to make his polemic more convincing [It is at least the opinion of G. Sasaki that Vasubandhu may have deliberately made the Vibhasa sound more dogmatic than it is (A. study of Abhidharma Philosophy, Introduction, p 3 ff).]), but also in the treatises of Sanghabhadra and the Dipakara themselves. To return to the question of "dravyas", the Vaibhasikas consider the sense-fields such true entities, though strictly speaking they meet neither of the criteria given above. A sense-field is really a collection of dravyas, grouped together because of certain common distinctive general characteristics (samanyavisesalaksana)—they are thus (in our usage) "dravyasat", but not paramarthasat. Vasubandhu attacked the Vaibhasikas for calling such a collection a "dravya", and said that their use of the term was inconsistent and capricious (Kosa II, ad 22). As a matter of fact, for the Vaibhasika to remain consistent, a "sense-field" can have only "truth of designation", since they are collections of atoms (cf. Kosa I, ad 44a-b), and the individual atoms themselves, according to the Vaibhasika, are not perceptible, and thus cannot be sense-fields (Kosa I, ad 20a-b). Similarly, an aggregate making up "personality" cannot be a real entity, since it is a series of momentary events (Ibid). It had been usual for along time within Abhidharma to subsume all the basic constituents of experience under at least one aggregate, and one of the sense-fields (See the methodology of Dhatukatha I). This again cannot be an ultimately real way of looking at things, particularly if atomism is adhered to. On the other hand, an object-of-consciousness has to be a real entity, because what isn't real has no faculty for producing a cognition, according to the Vaibhasika. The Vaibhasikas' atom has no such faculty, and "aggregations of atoms", which are said to have it, have no unity, and thus can't be entities, following, the Vaibhasikas' other criterion. Vasubandhu, on this and other grounds (see Kosa I ad 10; I ad 13; I ad 44; II ad 22; I ad 43c-d, III ad l00a-b), dispenses with atomism, and, while maintaining the two criteria, regards as dravya that which is perceived as one, thus ruling out the Vaibhasika atom as well as collections such as "a body", "an army", etc. (Dignaga, following Vasubandhu, also criticized the Vaibhasika atom on the grounds mentioned above, cf. Pramanasamuccaya I, II, ad 2c-d, Hattori, pp. 33-34; Alambanapariksa, and cf. Hattori, n.2, 17, p. 118. Similar arguments are to be found in the Jain logician Mallavadi, cf. Dvadasaranyacakra, ed, Muni Jambuvijaya, p. 96). Sanghabhadra himself drops the Vibhasa's criteria, and the character of a dravya is for him simply that it can give rise to a citta, when this citta arises without having to depend on anything but the one thing perceived (Nyayanusara, chapt. 50, MCB V, pp. 28-29). According to Sanghabhadra^ a dravya may differ in bhavas, specific types, but its general manner of being, its svabhava, is of one sort. This would seem to be some sort of a distinction between essential and secondary characteristics, which the Vibhasa itself, in spite of some resulting difficulties, does not make. In fact it considers this distinction a major flaw in the theories of the Bhadanta Dharmatrata (Vibhasa, MCB V, p 24). It is certainly anathema to Vasubandhu, who holds that criteria for the determination of primary, as against secondary, characteristics cannot be found (A Discussion for the Demonstration of Action, 15-17). [6] Alambana. This term is here translated as "object-of-consciousness" in order to bring out the distinction between it and visaya. The latter is usually defined as the object of the sense-organ itself, whereas the former is the object of the corresponding consciousness. The visaya is properly the "thing out there" as the organ comes "into contact" with it; the alambana is one's impression of it. (See Kosa I, ad 29b-c.) On "citta", see pp. 59-60. [7] See A Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p. 65. [8] Vipakahetu, "Retributory cause" or "maturational cause". A retributory cause is any volitional act with an ethical "charge" strong enough to give the result either of suffering or of freedom from suffering for the "series" which instigated it (cf. Kosa II, 54c-d). Presumably, what is intended here by "a configuration which has arisen from former aspiration" is any change in shape, size, etc. which was longed for in the past, and which has finally been attained due to beneficial past actions. Sumatisila's example, "May I have lips as red as a bimba-fruit" (Karmasiddhitika p. 204, 4, 8) is perhaps not completely adequate, as this would not necessarily entail a change of configuration for the Vaibhasika. But it is a humorous example of the kinds of rather frivolous motivations which often lay behind Buddhist acts of piety. As an example of such an aspiration which includes the Vaibhasikas' "configuration", and yet echoes the spirit of Sumatisila's example, there is the following inscription of the Burmese Queen Caw, from the 8th-9th centuries, marking the dedication of a monastery at Pagan: "Meantime, before I reach Nirvana, by virtue of the great work of merit I have done, may I prosper as a man and be more happy than all other men. Or as a spirit, may I be full of color, dazzling brightness, and victorious beauty. But more especially I would like to have a long life, freedom from disease, a lovely complexion, a pleasant voice, and a beautiful figure. I would like to be the loved and honored darling of every man and spirit. Gold, silver, rubies, coral, pearls, and other lifeless treasure—elephants, horses, and other living treasure—may I have lots of them. By virtue of my power and glory I would be triumphant with pomp and retinue, with fame and splendor. Wherever I am born, may I be filled with noble graces, and not know one speck of misery, and after I have tasted and enjoyed the happiness of men and the happiness of spirits, may I at last attain the peaceful bliss of Nirvana." (Archeological Survey of Burma, inscription no. 334, quoted Niharranjan Ray, Theravada Buddhism in Burma, p. 165.) [9] The Vaibhasika Atomic Theory. The atomic theory evolved by the Vaibhasika philosophers is found neither in the Jnanaprasthana, the ancient work on which the Vibhasa is ostensibly a commentary, nor in any of the other "padas" of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma (see McGovern, Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 125). One of the earliest texts to give the theory is apparently the Abhidharmasara of Dharmasri, which was translated into Chinese (Taisho 1550) in 250 A.D. McGovern thinks that Dharmasri borrowed the theory from Kanada, and that the Jain atomic theory may have a similar source. But Dharmasri's atomism is quite different in nature from Kanada's, and the Jain theory, which may actually antedate Kanada, differs radically from them both, (cf. Schubring, Doctrine of the Jainas, pp. 131 ff). An important difference between Dharmasri’s and Kanada's atomism is that for Kanada, atoms are eternal, whereas for Dharmasri, they are momentary, though they may form "series". Another difference lies in the fact that Dharmasri maintains fourteen different kinds of atoms: Besides the atoms of the four great elements (see p. 75), each sense-object and sense-organ has within it a special kind of atom to which its particular qualities are due (Abhidharmasara 1, quoted McGovern, p. 126). This is, as McGovern says, similar to the conception of late 19th century chemistry, where each of the ninety odd elements was held to have a special kind of atom. Though perhaps the seed for Dharmasri's atomism may be seen in his familiarity with the Vaisesika and Jain theories, to speak of outright borrowing, as McGovern does, is somewhat strong in the light of the fact that Dharmasri's theory is really quite unique, and moulded to Buddhist sentiments of impermanence. Dharmasri's theory is considered standard by the Vibhasa, which makes frequent use of it. Through this highly influential text it found its way not only into the crystallizations of its system in the philosophies of the "Neo-Vaibhasikas": Sanghabhadra, the Dipakara, and, in fundamental opposition, Vasubandhu, but even into the Theravada theories of Buddhaghosa (in the Althasalini) and Anuruddha (Compendium, p. 164 if). (The question of the extent of Vaibhasika influence on 5th century Theravada has as yet not been much investigated: There is a possibility that Buddhaghosa derived many of his specific theories from the Vibhasd. Certainly Anuruddha's atomism, at any rate, is identical with the Vibhasa. On a probable influence of Vasubandhu's Yogacara on 5th century Theravada, see S. Sarathcandra, "The Abhidhamma Psychology of Perception and the Yogacara Theory of Mind," U. of Ceylon Review IV, 1956, pp. 49-57.) There are thus, in standard Vaibhasika theory these fourteen different kinds of atoms: atoms of "earth", "fire", "water", and "wind", atoms of color, sound, smell, taste, and the tangible, eye-atoms, ear-atoms, nose-atoms, tongue-atoms, and body-atoms, for the specific parts of these organs that function as sense-fields for the consciousnesses (On the arrangement of these special atoms in the organs, see Kosa I, ad 43c-44d). The atoms corresponding to the sense-fields own their origination and specific qualities to transformations and combinations within the elemental atoms—therefore they are called "derivative"(upadaya) or "secondary" (bhautika). In the theories of Sanghabhadra and the Vaibhasika as criticized by Vasubandhu, a minimum of eight kinds of atoms must join to form an aggregation or molecule (sanghata), for actual perceptibility in the realm of desires, i.e. the normal world outside of meditation(Kosa II, ad 22). These are the four kinds of elemental atoms and the four atoms of color, odor, taste, and secondary tangibility (i.e. smoothness, roughness, etc. Primary tangibility—liquidity,etc., is a mark of the four great elements themselves). Each atom of derivative materiality needs a set of four elemental atoms for itself, so that the actual number of atoms in the simplest molecule is sixteen. In the case of molecules which resound, there will in addition be present a sound-atom, so that there will be five derivative and twenty elemental atoms. The molecules of the simplest animate bodies will become even complex, since they must each contain an atom of the tactile sense, touch being in Vaibhasika biological theory, as in Aristotle's and Darwin's the most basic and primordial sense held by living beings. Molecules of the other sense-organs must have at least ten kinds of atoms, since each must contain not only the four elemental atoms, four sense-object atoms, and the atom of tactile sense, but also an additional kind of atom for the particular sense-organ in question. It can thus be seen that no matter what the number of atoms in a molecule may be, the four great elements always appear together, and in equal proportion. There is as much of the hot element, "fire", in wood, or in water, as there is in a flame. The difference lies only in the "intensity", which is not further explained (at least not in the Kosa, the Dipa, and the Abhidharmavatara). Vasubandhu says that the presence of "water", the cohesive element, in a flame is proved by the flame's keeping a shape, and the presence of the solid element, "earth", in water, is shown by the fact that water can support a ship (Kosa II, ad 22). Within this theory, an atom should strictly speaking be that portion of materiality so small that it cannot be subjected to further division, whether physically or by reasoning, just as the moment is the smallest extent of time. This is the manner in which Sanghabhadra defines it (Nyayanusara 23, 3, cf. La Vallee Poussin, Kosa II, p. 144, note 3). But Vasubandhu notes that occasionally there is an inconsistency in the terminology of the Vaibhasikas, i.e. sometimes they say "atom" when they should say "aggregation of atoms" (Kosa II, ad 22). Sanghabhadra himself is very careful to make the distinction (La Vallee Poussin, Kosa II, p. 145, note 3), but it seems somewhat botched in the discussion of the Dipakara(D;>a II, 110-111, pp. 65-66). For the Dipakara, the atoms are the ultimate units of materiality which have the capacity for appearing in the world, i.e. they would correspond to what Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra designate as an "aggregation". When referring to the different elements making up this "atom", the Dipakara speaks only of "entities” (Dravya). Furthermore, his discussion differs from Sahghabhadra’s and Vasubandhu's on the question of the minimum number of kinds of "entities" necessary for an atom's appearance in the realm of desires. He says seven, which presumably would be the four great elements, color, odor, and taste—the tangible being for him entirely included within the properties of the great elements. [10] See note 5a. [11] The Vaisesika Theory of Composite wholes This theory, which states that a composite exists as a new entity, a composite whole (avayavin) penetrating its component parts, is, as Vasubandhu tells us, a specialty of the Vaisesikas. However, it is not found in the sutras of Kanada himself, but rather finds its first extant explicit mention in the Nyaya-sutras of Gautama (Nyaya-sutra II, I 31-37; IV, II 4-16). It is further elaborated by Prasastapada and by Vatsyayana, both of whom may have been older contemporaries of Vasubandhu (cf. Prasastapada-bhasyatikasangraha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 255, pp. 169, 173; Vatsyayana, Nyayabhasya, ad II, I, 31-37; ad IV, II 4-16). The reasons for the formulation of this theory are, in brief, the following: The Vaisesika, like the Vaibhasika, subscribes to an atomic theory, though his atoms, unlike the moment-atoms of the Vaibhasika, are eternal. To both, discrete and detached minute entities form the basic stuff of the material universe. External reality as it presents itself to us however has unified realities, and the question emerges as to what the unifying agency is. To the Vaibhasika, as to Vasubandhu, and as later to Dignaga, these unities are constructed subjectively, but the Vaisesika, being a "realist" (curiously in both the modern and medieval senses of the term), has to posit an objective reality as their basis. There is furthermore a problem because Vaisesika atoms, like Vaibhasika ones, are imperceptible, and yet their compounds are perceived (cf. Nyaya-sutra IV, II, 13-14). The Vaibhasika takes care of this problem by assuming that aggregations of atoms become perceptible, though atoms in isolation are imperceptible, just as one hair may not be visible at a distance, but a mass of hair will be. The Vaisesika, however, assumes atoms to be absolutely imperceptible. Thus it is assumed by the Vaisesika that a composite is an entity in itself, having a different set of qualities from its parts, though occupying the same locus. If the composite whole did not exist, Vatsyayana says, one could only infer, and never directly perceive, objects like trees, since at any one time one has only a partial perception of parts of the tree. According to Vatsyayana, the perception of the composite whole "tree" takes place simultaneously with the perception of certain parts of the tree (Nyayabhasya, ad II, I, 30- 37). He adds that unitary conceptions, such as "tree", "jar", etc. must arise from something which is really one, and can't emerge from mere aggregations (Nyayabhasya, ad II, I, 37). The concept of the composite whole also plays a role in Nyaya-Vaisesika causality. In a cause and effect sequence, a new substance, a composite whole (cloth) emerges from the material causes (threads), and the parts continue to exist within the composite whole, though, according to Vatsyayana, the avayavin together with its parts make up only one entity. It was not until Uddyotakara that the parts were regarded as separate entities persisting along with the composite-whole entity. (See D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, pp 262-271, on the differences between the earlier causal theory of Vatsyayana, where the cause, as an entity, is destroyed before the emergence of the effect, and the later theory, hinted at by Uddyotakara, but not crystallized until Sridhara, where the causes continue to exist as entities within the composite whole.) Even to Vatsyayana, atomic causality is an exception: the two atoms making up the composite whole of a dyad or double-atom (dvyanuka) continue to exist as entities. The fact that all further combinations of atoms are composite wholes having different qualities from their parts, will explain why a jar is perceptible, whereas its atoms are not. Vasubandhu does not here bother to refute the composite whole alternative, since its mere mention would probably be enough to make a true Vaibhasika flinch. On a previous occasion, however, he has presented a refutation of the avayavin theory, a theory he considers "infantile"(Kosa III, ad l00a-b). His arguments there for the most part rest on the same sorts of epistemological reasons that Vatsyayana raises in favor of the concept. They can be outlined as follows: (1) When the organ of the visual or tactile consciousness is in contact with one thread, the cloth is not perceived. If the composite whole "cloth" exists in each thread, it would have to be perceived even if only one of its threads is (Kosa III, ad l00a-b, LVP, p 211). (2) If the Vaisesika says that the composite whole does not exist within each of its parts, how will it be demonstrated that it is anything but the collection of these parts? (Ibid, p 212). (3) If the Vaisesika says that the composite whole does exist within each of its parts, but that the perception of one thread does not result in the perception of cloth because the perception of cloth presumes contact of the organ with several of the parts, then if one sees the border of a cloth, one would see the whole cloth. (4) If the Vaisesika says that the perception of the composite whole depends upon the perception of its central and other portions, one could never see a composite whole, since one can never see its central and end- parts simultaneously. (5) If the Vaisesika says that these parts are perceived in succession, then the perception of "cloth" does not differ from the perception of a "circle" that results from hurling a torch in a full arc. Objects-of-conscious- ness of such perceptions cannot be real entities in any way. (6) When threads of different colors come together to form a cloth, how can this cloth be considered an entity? (Ibid, pp 212-213). This argument depends on the fact that according to Vaisesika metaphysics, qualities like color, etc, must pervade their substances wholly. Thus one substance can have only one quality of a type. So what does one do with a cloth of many colors? Clearly it cannot be a substance-entity in the Vaisesika sense. This last argument was quite terrifying to the Vaisesikas, and prompted Uddyotakara to assume that "variegated color" must in this case be regarded as one color. This conclusion was rejected as absurd by the Navya-Naiyayikas (cf. Shastri, p 256). Even admitting Uddyotakara's rather far-fetched solution, the question can be re-phrased in a manner which makes the problem remain: What does one do about a cloth which is variegated in color, but has a border of one color only? Other criticisms, some of which had already disturbed Vatsyayana: (1) If one thing exists at one place, it can't at the same time exist in another. According to Vatsyayana, the dyad, being a composite whole, resides in its two parts. But its existence in one atom would necessarily exclude its existence in the other. (2) Does the composite whole, which is one, pervade its parts in its entirety, or partially? In (he former case, the composite whole will be exhaust ed in one part, and the remaining parts will be without it. In the latter case, the composite whole must itself have further parts, by which it pervades its constituent parts. (3) If the composite whole is a different entity from its parts, it should have a different weight. (4) There seems to be no criterion for which combinations of entities give rise to a composite whole (not all do, e.g. a forest does not). (5) Nor which objects should be regarded as ultimate composite wholes (i.e. those which cannot form further composite wholes). (6) No composite whole can be formed out of parts based on different material elements, because there is no possibility of generality (samanya), which must inhere in every particular instance, according to the Vaisesika. Thus neither a human body, which contains blood (water-element), as well as earth-elements, nor a tree (with its sap) can be a composite whole. [12] This passage is close to, but not identical with, Kosa IV, ad 2b-3b. Both the Kosa and the Demonstration of Action passages have been translated into French with some confusion (which cannot, of course, be usually said for translators as eminent as La Vallee Poussin and Lamotte). Actually, there is some confusion in the Tibetan translation of the Kosa passage as well, since "vrtta", which definitely means "circle", has been translated as "lham-pa", "square' (Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripitaka, vol. 115, p 193, I,f5 ff; cf. the Sanskrit original, ed. Pradhan, p 194). This error is probably the source of the Mahavyutpatti's confusion where it gives words which unequivocally mean "circular" (Vrtta) and "quadrangular" (Iham-pa) as synonyms (Mahavyutpatti 1878-1886). In the definition of "square" given in this treatise, the phrase "in each of four sides)" is supplied from Hsüan-tsang's translation (Taisho 1609, vol. 31, p. 781 b-c). The Sanskrit original of the term "square" in this treatise may have been "varga". This is the term for "square" employed by Arya-bhata in both the senses of an "equiquadrangular" and "the product of two equal quantities". (Aryabhatiya, II v. 3: " Vargas sama-caturasrah phalanca sadrsa-dvayasya samvargah." "Square" means 'an equiquadrangular'; 'the area (of such a quadrangular)', and 'the product of two equal quantities.") The terms "unnata" and "avanata" have been rendered by both translators into French as "high" and "low", respectively. However, though "unnata" is a common word for "high", "avanata" does not usually mean "low". Besides, the inclusion of "high" and "low" in a list that has already included "long" and "short", seems somewhat strange. Add to this the fact that Vasubandhu's definitions of the terms "unnata" and "avanata" make little sense if they are supposed to refer to "high" and "low". They in fact define the terms "convex" and "concave". The translation of "unnata" by "convex", and "avanata" by "concave", is unproblematical as far as the Sanskrit is concerned. "Unnata" means not only "raised, elevated", etc. but also, as Apte's dictionary provocatively puts it, "projecting, plump, full (as breasts)" (p. 435). And though we may not want to translate "unnata" as "convex" when we are translating Kalidasa ("niba-donnata-stanam": "full, projecting breasts", Malavikagnimitra, Act II, v. 3), this translation fits well with the less passionate and more analytic point of view of a fellow Gupta. protégé, Vasubandhu. Malavika's shapely breasts must certainly be appreciated by Vasubandhu at least as ideal examples of convex configurations. As for "avanata", it never seems to mean "low" in classical Sanskrit, but rather "bent down", "stooped", "crouched", "bowed". All these are concave configurations. Further light on the terms was provided by "Sai-chien-ti-lo's" Abhidharmavatara. In its list of the various kinds of configuration, the usual terms "mthon-po" and "dma'-ba" are omitted, and in their place we have "sgang'' and "gshong" (Tokyo Peking Tibetan Tripitaka vol. 119, p 44, 1, I). "Sgang" means "a hill-spur, the ridge or top of a hill" (Sarat Candra Das, p 320), and seems to be cognate to the verb "sgang-ba", "to grow" or "become full", specifically used in the "becoming full" of a nubile girl (Jaschke, p 114). "Gshong" can also be a "mountain-ridge", and it seems to be cognate to the verb shong-ba, "to have room or space in" and "to remove and carry away." A mountain-spur can be either convex or concave, depending on what part one is looking at, but the term sgang emphasizes the projection, a convexity, whereas gshong emphasizes the cavity, a concavity. A "valley" is indeed "low" in comparison to a mountain, but even more it too is a concavity. The terms "sata" and "visata", finally, have been translated by both Lamotte and La Vallee Poussin as "egal" and "inegal". But it makes little sense to speak of a configuration "equal", since "equal" expresses a relationship. The trouble may lie in the fact that Vasubandhu defines "sata" as "sama-sthana", and "visata" as "visama-sthana" (Kosa lad l0a, Pradhan, p 9). This is the old Vaibhasika definition, as can be seen by the Abhidharmavatara's definitions "mnyam-pa" and "mi mnyam-pa": "sama" and "visama" (Tib vol. 119, p. 44, 1, 2). Now "sama" may mean "equal", but that is by no means the only meaning of the term. It also means "even, level, straight, plain, easy, pleasant, convenient". "Visama" correspondingly may mean "uneven, not level, rough, painful, troublesome". Besides, "sata" never means "equal", anyway. Its meaning is "sharpened, whetted, polished, smoothed, made even, thin, pleasant". It is clear that as configurations, "sata" and "visata" must mean something like "even" and "uneven", or "straight" and "crooked". Vasubandhu's definitions seem to bear this out. (Sama and visama occur again at Kosa I, ad l0c, Pradhan, p7; La Vallee Poussin, p 18, in reference to smells. Here, La Vallee Poussin's translation "excessives" and "non-excessives" are very good. This is the "pleasant" and "rough" aspect of sama and visama.) It is interesting that Vasubandhu here concentrates solely on the visual aspect of "configuration", which becomes reduced to color. And as far as visual configuration is concerned, this reduction seems unassailable, particularly if one remembers that the ancient Indians, unconfined by the definitions of modern optics, regarded any shades of light and dark as colors. The Vaibhasikas in their color-lists included, of the colors recognized by ordinary language, only white and the primary colors blue, yellow, and red. Green, etc. were correctly recognized as compound colors, and thus unworthy of entry into a list of elements. Aside from these four, the Vaibhasikas listed as colors cloudy (abhram), smoky (dhumah), dusty (rajah), misty (mahika), shadowy (chaya), bright or hot light (atapa), dimmer or reflected light (aloka), and darkness (andhakara) (cf. Kosa I, ad l0a, Pradhan, p 6, La Vallee Poussin, p 16), which seem to be different gradations and mixtures of light and dark. In contrast to his exclusive focus on visual configuration in this treatise, Vasubandhu in the Kosa (IV, ad 3c) had made a powerful argument against configuration's being an entity on the grounds that configuration is equally an object of the fifth, or tactile consciousness, as of the first or visual. In fact, the convexity of Malavika's breasts can perhaps be most fully appreciated by means of the fifth, not the first, consciousness ! The Vaibhasika objection that the tactile consciousness does not properly apprehend configurations, but only construes them on the apprehension of certain arrangements of the soft, hard, etc. is brilliantly converted by Vasubandhu into the statement that the visual consciousness does not apprehend them either, but similarly construes them on the apprehension of certain arrangements of colors. "Configuration" is thus not a distinct object-of-consciousness which could be allotted definitely to one sense-field, and as such is not a real entity, at all. Why Vasubandhu chose to omit this beautiful argument from this treatise is puzzling. Perhaps he thought he had enough refutations, already. *The geometry of Vasubandhu and Aryabhata. Aryabhata's geometry is particularly interesting to a student of the Demonstration of Action, as this great mathematician is not too distant from Vasubandhu in both time and place. Aryabhata, who is the earliest extant exponent of the mathematics and astronomy of the school of Pataliputra, gives his own birth-date as 476, and the date of the composition of his treatise as 499 (Aryabhatiya III, v. 10). This is assuming that he used the date 3102 B.C. for the beginning of the Kali-yuga, which is almost certain, as in fact he may be one of the foremost exponents of this date (cf. Fleet, "The Kaliyuga Era of B.C. 3102", JRAS 1911, pp 480 ff). The Sanskrit reads: "Sasty abdanam sastir yada vyatitas trayas ca yugapadah, try-adhika vimsatir abdas tadeha mama janmano "titah." "Now, when three yugapadas and sixty times sixty years have elapsed, twenty-three years of my life have passed."- (N.B. The end of the third yugapada marks the beginning of the Kali-yuga.) He specifies Kusumapura, i.e. Pataliputra, as the seat of his activity, or at least as the place where his work was appreciated. (II, v. 1: "Aryabhatas tviha nigadati Kusumapure 'bhyarcitarn jnanam.") He may thus also have been a subject of the Guptas, presumably of Budhagupta and his successors. He is most famous for his contributions to astronomy, arithmetic, and algebra. He was apparently the first Indian astronomer to hold that the earth is a sphere and rotated on an exis (IV 2, 6, 7, 9), for which he was criticized by Brahmagupta and other later astronomers. His arithmetic and algebra is quite advanced. And though his solid geometry often leaves something to be desired (cf. II, 6b and 7b), his plane geometry is quite impressive. For instance, he arrives at a usable value for TT, 3. 1416 (II, 10). Unfortunately, the Aryabhatiya is not a complete text of mathematics, and many definitions are taken for granted. However, there are certain definitions of shapes in Aryabhata, and these contrast with Vasubandhu's in several interesting, though to some extent predictable, ways. Aryabhata defines "square" quite rigorously from a mathematical point of view: "Vargas sama-caturasrah" (II, v. 3): "'Square* means 'equiquadrangular' " i.e. a plane figure which has only four angles, all of them equal. His term for "equiquadrilateral", a quadrilateral whose sides, but not necessarily whose angles, are equal, would be "samacaturbhuja" (cf. II, 11). Following this definition, Vasubandhu's is geometrically inexact, as he is defining the seeing of an equiquadrilateral only. (There might be the temptation to accuse Aryabhata's commentator Paramesvara of a similar slip in his gloss on "equiquadrangular". He says, "Yasya caturasrasya ksetrasya catyaro bahavah parasparam samas syuh karnadvayan ca parasparam samam bhavet tat ksetram samacaturasram ity ucyates." "Any quadrangular plane figure of which plane figure all sides are equal to each other, and of which both diagonals are equal to each other, is called an 'equiquadrangular'." But karna, "diagonal", is actually a very special sort of diagonal, meaning only one which conjoins with a right angle. Thus it is used for the hypotenuse of a right triangle and the diagonal of a square or rectangle. Thus Paramesvara's definition holds.) Aryabhata's definition, on the other hand, is useless for Vasubandhu's purposes, i.e. as an aid for discovering what is occurring physio-psychologically when we speak of "seeing a square". It does not include anything that Vasubandhu could recognize as being fundamentally, i.e. psychologically, existent. It must however be noted that what we see as "square" is actually not always, as Vasubandhu says, a "color-aggregation which appears equal in each of four sides." This may be how we geometrically determine that it is a square or equiquadrilateral rhombus, but if we take into account what the visual consciousness presents to us, whenever we speak of a "square", an equal appearance of each of the four sides is not always involved. At present there is a "square" piece of paper on "my" desk—but what the visual consciousness is actually presenting to "me" is a kind of rhomboid with unequal sides. Vasubandhu may leave himself a way out with his verb "appear", which could include interpretations immediately put on the object of visual consciousness. Thus, while Aryabhata's is a precise mathematician's definition, Vasubandhu's may be almost as good a one for telling us what underlies it psychologically. In fact, it is in dealing with plane figures that Vasubandhu's reduction of shape to color is most convincing. Aryabhata, though he gives us several methods for determining whether a figure is a circle (II, 7; II, 3) unfortunately gives us no complete definition. Vasubandhu's definition is an impeccable one, which even Aryabhata could have appreciated. [13] The causes and conditions for dyeing an object here enumerated may refer to different types of dyeing, any deliberate changing of an object's color being referred to in this way. Fire, as Sumatisila's explanations show [Karmasiddhitika, p 206, 3, 4.], refers perhaps primarily to the firing of pottery. But the other three examples, like Sumatisila's additional example of "chemical dyes"[Ibid, p 206, 3, 2.], seem to refer to the dyeing of garments. Fire also being an auxiliary condition in cloth-dyeing (the boiling of water containing colorific plants and chemical dyestuffs), perhaps all the examples actually refer to the dyeing of garments. Bleaching also being regarded as a dyeing process, the inclusion of "the sun" and "ice" becomes clear to one who is familiar with the ancient bleaching processes employed in Kashmir and Gandhara. Freshly-dyed garments were often bleached by long exposure to the sun, and encasing a garment in ice had a similar effect. On some of the dyeing techniques employed in ancient India, see Jataka no. 38; Asanga, Mahayanasangraha I, 18, pp 36-37. [14] In reply to a similar Sammitiya argument in favor of external causes of destruction, Vasubandhu had already previously engaged in a rigorous investigation of combustion (Kosa IV, ad 2-3)—an investigation which, like so many of Vasubandhu's regarding natural phenomena, leaves us with the most un-rigid conclusion ("Whatever you may say about it may be right, but isn't necessarily so"). The Sammitiya supposes his argument, that in the case of combustion, fire is the external cause for the destruction of the wood, to be self-evident, i.e. "demonstrable through the means-of-cognition of direct perception". Vasubandhu however counters that actually there is nothing like "a direct perception" of the destruction of wood, just as there is no direct perception of motion. When we suppose that wood is being destroyed because of its relation with fire, it is simply because we no longer see the wood intact after such a relation. To go from the direct perception of the disappearance of the wood to the assumption that fire is the external cause of the wood's destruction, involves an inference, and what's more, an inference which is not entirely fool-proof. Actually, Vasubandhu says, the fact that we no longer see the wood after its relation with fire is susceptible to two interpretations: either the wood is destroyed on account of the relationship, as the Sammitiyas claim, or the wood is constantly changing within itself, and maintaining a certain continuity because of other factors within itself, which factors are transformed in proximity with fire. Vasubandhu accuses the Sammitiya of inconsistency, for the Sammitiya does admit that flames are destroyed spontaneously, and yet a gust of wind, conventionally speaking, may "put out a flame". To the Sammitiya, this means only that the wind has served as a catalyst for hastening a process which would at any rate have come about. Vasubandhu says that analogously, the flame may only be a similar catalyst in regard to wood. He thinks that this alternative is not only just as possible as the other, but even more likely, since the wood is not destroyed immediately when brought into contact with fire. Relating the same argumentation to the dyeing example, Vasubandhu would argue that there is a constant series of modifications in the products resulting from contact with fire, rather than the fire itself changing the product. We may symbolize the reactions as follows:
There are an infinite number of conditions that may give rise to F, and X some of them are clearly not dependent on anything external, but rather to changes within the fire itself. Wind is not necessarily the cause for a flame's destruction, as the following may equally well happen:
The idea that any one reaction (or intervention of a substance) should be held an inevitable cause for any given other substance, or its annihilation, seems to be ruled out in Vasubandhu's framework. [15] The cause of a cannot at the same time be the cause for the destruction of a. This axiom is traceable to the Vaisesika-sutras of Kanada, where it occurs as follows: "A substance is not destroyed either by its effect or by its cause" (Na dravyam karyam karanam ca badhati.", KS I, I, 12). This axiom seems to have been accepted at large among Indian philosophic circles. Kanada himself of course restricted it to substances, which are only one kind of entity within his system. He in fact supplies an answer to Vasubandhu's contention here (8a), that sounds need no external cause of destruction, by assuming that attributes like sound are destroyed by their effects, as well as by their causes. The first sound in a series of sounds is destroyed by its effect, i.e. the succeeding sound, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last sound but one destroys the last (the axiom "Ubhayatha gunah", VS I, I, 13). Vasubandhu presented a refutation of Vaisesika-sutra I, I, 13 at Kosa IV, ad 2-3, LVP, p 6, bottom, and is thus able to extend the axiom of VS I, J, 12 over the whole range of Vaisesika categories. In the case cited in this treatise, the destruction of a characteristic cannot occur on ac count of the same causes which are responsible for its intensification. [16] These are examples of what are termed "homogeneous causes" (sabha-gahetu) in Vaibhasika philosophy. This type of cause was fully accepted by Vasubandhu (Kosa II, 52a-c). When a substance gradually gives rise to another substance, in such a manner that one can speak of a "transformation of the original substance", and no other external substance can be recruited to serve as an external cause for this transformation, Vasubandhu and the Vibhasa speak of the original substance's being a "homogeneous cause" for the latter substance. The concept of "homogeneous cause" served to fill many gaps in causality which we nowadays explain by chemical decomposition, or the intrusion of microbes. As regards the latter example, Vasubandhu has perhaps the last card, since the growth of an organism itself is termed by him an instance of homogeneous causation. The advantage of employing the concept of homogeneous causality in this instance lies in the fact that the continuity between the event at locus A and the new event at locus B could be accounted for. [17] The element wind being properly the mobile principle which expands and displaces, its role as the principle of motion is recognized by both Vasubandhu and the Sauryodayika. Vasubandhu, who, as regards motion, carries a Heraclitean stand to a Parmenidean conclusion in this treatise, 10, must of course modify the traditional viewpoint considerably. For him, calling the element wind the mobile principle can mean only that it is responsible for making a new event arise in another locus immediately subsequently to a previous event which is related to the new event by being its homogeneous cause. Again we see that "mental" phenomena such as citta, and "material" elements such as "wind", are genetically related in such a manner as to make a dichotomy untenable. In Kosa IX (LVP, p 294, Pradhan, p 477, 1-2), Vasubandhu enumerates the processes taking place to give rise to a "manifest bodily action", as follows: A drive or impulse (chandas) is followed by an initial mental application (vitarka) towards an effort, which effort produces a wind-series which in turn sets the body "into motion ". [17a]"beneficial": kusala, "unbeneficial": akusala. Sometimes translated as "good" and "bad". These are not very good translations, because the ultimate good of Buddhism is the eradication of suffering. Kusala actions are those which have results and retributions conducive to the eradication of suffering, akusala those which have results and retributions of suffering. Thus, kusala actions are productive of good, i.e. the alleviation of suffering. The caused good itself is always retributionally indeterminate. Thus Nirvana itself is so categorized, (cf. Dhammasangani 983, 989; C. Rhys-Davids Buddh. Psych., p 139.) The Karmaprajnapti-sastra extends this principle even further, stating that though volitions in meditation where one is not fully concentrated are kusala, volitions where one is completely collected and tranquil, are indeterminate. (Karmaprajnapti, Peking/Tokyo vol. 115, p 87, 2, 406: "gzhan yang yongs su zin pa ma yin pas bstam gtan bzhi dang gzugs med pa bzhi bsgom pa'i, sems pa gang yin pa nas sems mngon par du byed pa dang yid kyi las kyi bar du sbyar te 'di ni dge ba'i sems pa zhes bya'o—". p 87, 5, 3-5: "yongs su zin pa'i sems kyis bsam gtan bzhi dang gzugs med pa bzhi—'di ni lung du ma bstan pa'i sems pa zhes bya'o//" "Furthermore, any volition—impelling of citta, and mental action of one who is cultivating the four meditations and the four imageless attainments with cittas which are not completely collected, is designated as a beneficial volition. Any volition—impelling, of citta, and mental action, of one who is cultivating the four meditations^ etc. with cittas completely collected, is designated as indeterminate.") [18] Configuration having been refuted as an entity, is manifest action to be accounted for simply by the remaining visible quality, the "moving" color combinations which we see when we say "I see him doing that"? Vasubandhu seems to be playing here, and relishing a series of totally absurd alternatives. A given color can clearly intrinsically be neither beneficial nor unbeneficial, as all meteriality is basically indeterminate (cf. Kosa I, ad 29c-d, Kathavatthu VIII, 9). [19] On the gradual shift of this term from being the honored epithet of the Emperor Asoka, to meaning something like "simple fool", see S. Levi, Journal Asiatique 1891, p 549, and Bull. Ac. Roy. de Belgique, 1923, p 35 ff. The usage is common in Vasubandhu (cf. Kosa II, ad 26a-c), and also in Sankara (Brahmasutrabhasya ad I, 2, 8; ad II 4, 5). [20] The eye proper, i.e. the actual seeing part of the eye, is itself inferred, not seen, since according to the Vaibhasika theory accepted by Vasubandhu it consists of an invisible sentient materiality covering what is convention ally called "the eye". It is inferred through its force or efficacy of presenting visibles to our citta-series (cf. Kosa I, ad 9). On this sentient materiality, see also Dhammasangani 616, 628, and Vibhanga 122. [21] According to the Vibhasa, the arising of an unmanifest action is not the same in the three "realms"(see Discussion of the Five Aggregates, note 12). In the realm of desires, restraint or absence of restraint is always originated by a manifest bodily or verbal action. In the states subsumed under "the realm of images", discipline is subordinated directly to citta. This cannot be true in the realm of desires, since unmanifest action develops even when cittas are absent in sleep. Vasubandhu, in denying the real existence of manifest actions, i.e. bodily and verbal actions which themselves carry an ethical and retributional nature, must also deny "unmanifest action" in the realm of desires. As a matter of fact, Vasubandhu had already lambasted the entire Vaibhasika concept of "unmanifest action"(Kosa IV, ad 3c). [22] A bodily action may have a double ethical charge, which results in its being indeterminate only inasmuch as its beneficiality and unbeneficiality are roughly equal. Because unmanifest action according to the Vaibhasikas is always either clearly beneficial or unbeneficial, it could never occur in connection with such a manifest action. According to Vasubandhu unmanifest action is also ruled out as an explanation of the unbeneficiality of an impure monk's remaining silent during the Pratimoksa confessional, since for the Vaibhasika to be consistent, he must here also assume a prior manifest action, which simply does not seem to occur in this case. Sanghabhadra attempts to defend the Vaibhasika position by noting that the very sitting down in an assembly hall for the recital constitutes a previous manifest action (cf. Kosa IV, LVP, pp 163-164, n 5). This argumentation is feeble, because, as has been shown, unmanifest action cannot arise from actions which are indeterminate. Vasubandhu would of course explain the unbeneficiality of the monk's silence simply by the unbeneficiality of his volition to remain silent. If he remains silent without such a motivation, e.g. if he has suddenly been struck dumb, there can be for Vasubandhu no question of a misdeed. Vasubandhu succeeds here in giving a viable explanation for what determines the ethical nature of a "sin of omission", where Sanghabhadra, in his attempt to buttress the traditional Vaibhasika structure, seems to singularly fail. [23] The existence of past and future events is the cardinal doctrine of the old Sarvastivada school, from which the Vaibhasika is derived. It is criticized already by the Kathavatthu (I, 6-7), and defended against these criticisms by the snarling polemic of Devasarman, author of the Vijnanakaya (Vijnanakaya. tr. La Vallee Poussin, Etudes Asiatiques 1925, pp 343 ff). The Vibhasa adopts the theory (Vibhasa 76, p 393b, tr. La Vallee Poussin, MCB V, pp 5 ff), and the genius of the "Great Four Masters" of the Vibhasa was enlisted to explain it. These philosophers are the Bhadanta Vasumitra, the Bhadanta Dharmatrata, Ghosaka, and Buddhadeva. All their theo ries are rejected by Vasubandhu (Kosa ad V 25-28). The doctrine was again defended against Vasubandhu by orthodox Vaibhasikas such as Sanghabhadra (Abhidharmanyayanusara 50-52, MCB V, pp 75 if) and the Dipakara (Abhidharmadipa V, 289-324, Jaini, pp 245 ff). The whole controversy was finally summarized by Santaraksita, Tattvasangraha 1793-1806. [24] The expression "pustule arising on top of a boil" was a common Sanskrit idiom at the time of Vasubandhu. It is found also in Kalidasa, Sakuntala Act II, opening speech of the Vidusaka: "Tato gandasyopari pindakah samrvrttah." The idiom is used to express the idea of additional troubles where troubles enough already abide. In this case, the troubles are the poor Vaibhasika's. [25] The process for the retribution of an act can be reduced, Vasubandhu says, either to a special transformation within the series of momentary events making up the aggregates of the "personality", or to a change in the state (avastha) of the act itself. The Bhadanta Vasumitra had reduced the differences among events in the three times to differences in their states, or modes of being (cf. Vibhasa 76, 11: Melanges 5: 1 ff). That is to say, a present event has a full efficacy range, and is able to give rise to visual, etc. objects-of-consciousness, whereas a past event, though existent, can only be remembered, and a future event only anticipated. As the Vibhasa itself had a clear preference for Vasumitra's explanation of the doctrine, the Vaibhasikas, who took it as their cardinal text, followed suit. The retribution of an act, following Vasumitra, would be explained by assuming that an act, though it loses its full efficacy-range as soon as it is past, continues to exist, and finally undergoes an additional change in its state, which allows it to give its retributional effect. The Vaibhasika vocabulary employed here involves some technicalities: An act "projects" an effect as long as it is present, but it "gives" its retributional effect when it is already past. The connection of the act with the aggregate-series is explained by the Vaibhasikas through praptis—see Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p. 70 note 16. Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhasika explanation, violates Aggregates, note 16.: Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhasika explanation, alternative 2, violates the principle of the momentariness of all events. This principle, is curiously enough, accepted by the Vaibhasika as much as it is by the Sautrantika. Vasubandhu's argument is however not a valid criticism of the Vaibhasika, given the Vaibhasika's framework. Vasubandhu is quick to recognize this himself, as he has the Vaibhasika reply with the proper Vaibhasika view of momentariness. Though in its "own-characteristics" an event exists in the past as well as the future (since it can be remembered or anticipated with all its characteristics), it no longer has the power to "project" its full effect, as it cannot be perceived by consciousnesses I-V. And it is this power, marking the event as a present phenomenon, which is momentary. When it ceases, we say that the event ceases, i.e. it has entered upon another state of being. [26] If the act is still around, what is it that keeps it from continuing effects similar to the effects it projected in its moment as a present event? In what sort of "cold storage" are we to assume the act to be? [27] The last moment of "one" who has eradicated all the root-afflictions does not project an effect. That is, once "such a person" dies, her or his physio-psychic series is not resumed within another existence: in other words, "she or he goes into Nirvana". [28] See Discussion of the Five Aggregates, note 29. [29]"The obtainment and development of an effect's seed" is a metaphorical expression employed by Vasubandhu for the existence of latent impressions within the series which may produce a new effect. The concept of "seeds" developing within a physio-psychic series is used to illustrate the continuity of the series, "prapti" serves much the same function for orthodox Vaibhasika philosophers (see Discussion of the Five Aggregates, note 18). But whereas Sanghabhadra and the Dipakara insist that prapti is a real entity apart from the series itself, it is recognized by Vasubandhu that his "seed" is only a metaphor for a force within entities constituting a "series" which allows them to gradually undergo transformations (Kosa II, ad 36c-d). More exactly, "a seed for an event" means simply the psychophysical complex itself, when it is capable of producing this effect, either immediately or mediately, through a transformation in "its own" "series". By this botanical analogy, Vasubandhu is able to maintain an organic, dynamically changing universe. [30] The view that a special event disassociated from citta is responsible for an act's retribution is, as Sumatisila tells us [Karmasiddhitika p 212, 5, 1.], a specialty of the Sammitiyas and Mahasanghikas. The Kathavatthu, which already discusses and criticizes the theory, attributes it to the Sammitiyas and the Andhakas (the Mahasanghikas of Andhra). There it is stated that according to the Sammitiyas and Andhakas, an event must be posited for the continuation of retributional results even in those cases where the citta-series is interrupted. Thus the citta-series itself cannot be responsible for retribution. The Kathavatthu counters that when mental processes are interrupted, the karmic process must by rights be broken off as well (Kathavatthu XV, 11). [31] Vasubandhu asks how the theory of "the accumulation" or "the imperishable" can explain memory. The problem of the retribution of acts is only an aspect of the larger problem of the continuity of the psycho-physical series. Thus any theory which explains retributions, but which cannot explain this continuity in broader terms, must be rejected as inadequate. One of the main problems regarding the continuity of the physio-psychical series is the question of memory. As Sumatisila tells us[Ibid, p 213, 1.], the theory of "the accumulation" or "the imperishable", cannot serve to account for memory, since an "accumulation", or "the imperishable", arises only, according to the Sammitiyas and Mahasanghikas, with acts that are clearly beneficial or unbeneficial. The studying of a text, and the initial perception of an object-of-sense, which serve as root-causes, for future memory regarding the text or object, are however completely indeterminate acts. Thus, an "accumulation" or "the imperishable" cannot arise in those cases. Even if it could, there would still remain the problem as to which moment produces the "accumulation". Is it the moment of the initial perception of the object, the moment in which the memory arises, or yet some other moment? Clearly none of these alternatives can explain the phenomenon. It is interesting to note that with all our so-called scientific knowledge, the factors of memory are still not really understood, though they have been the subject of psychological research since Hermann Ebbinghaus. The largely metaphorical solutions with which modern psychology has emerged, such as "changes in the synapse taking place with vivid impressions", "increase in the size of synaptic knobs following such impressions", though supportable by electro-stimulatory experimentation, are no more adequate or inadequate than Vasubandhu's admittedly metaphorical solution of an impression-storing consciousness-substratum, (cf. Rosvold's "Memory", McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, 1960, vol. 8, pp 216-223.) [32] The question of what goes on in the highest meditation, "the attainment of the cessation of feelings and cognitions", is one of the crucial problems in the psychology of the Northern Abhidharma theorists. This will become apparent later in this treatise. Here the problem more specifically is that the theory of "accumulation", or "the imperishable", cannot account for the re-emergence of the citta-series, since obviously no particular beneficial or unbeneficial action directly precedes this emergence.
[34] The "(mentally) constructed" is the lowest of three kinds of reality in Vasubandhu's later philosophy (Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, ad III 3b, Teaching of the Three Own-Beings, 1). It has sometimes been rendered as "the imaginary", but both its etymology and its characterizations by Vasubandhu (Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, ad III 12a; Teaching of the Three Own-Beings, 4-5) do not support such a translation, though the ontological status of "the imaginary" in ordinary language may be close to that of the parikalpita. The "parikalpita" is literally "the thoroughly constructed", which constricts consciousness into ever narrower grooves, and includes most notions of "common-sense" reality. It is thus the result not so much of the "imagination" condemned by some Western philosophers (e.g. Hobbes, or the Renaissance philosopher Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola in his On the Imagination), but rather on the very mental consciousness so praised by these gentlemen, i.e. the mental consciousness in its capacity for fabricating abstract constructions of its own, which are subsequently taken far too seriously. Less abstract categorizations, in fact delimiting anything at all with strict separations, fall also within the scope of the constructed (See Commentary of the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, ad III 12a). Mental consciousness in its colorful image-building fantasizing aspect is not in itself a danger to Vasubandhu, as it is to Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, otherwise Vasubandhu could hardly have been the great lover of Mahayana sutras he apparently was. [35] The previous example of the dyed lemon flower's resulting in a dyed lemon-core is here being used to illustrate the theory of the transformation of the psycho-physical series without the intervention of an entity external to it. In fact, Vasubandhu uses a vocabulary which completely parallels his ex ample, but which is difficult to carry over adequately into English. He uses the verb 'penetrate' (paribhavayati) in order to express the volition's lasting influence on the psycho-physical series, on the analogy of the liquid lac's penetrating the entire series of the lemon plant. This penetration, or influence, of the volition, results in a special force (he could as well have said "seed"), an alteration in the series which leads eventually to its own transformation. For Vasubandhu, the only real retribution lies within the psycho-physical series itself, and this is borne out by his famous arguments in The Twenty Verses demonstrating the irrationality of assuming external hells (Twenty Verses ad 3, 4). The transformation of the series theory perhaps does not really explain anything (how many schemata of modern physics, not to speak of modern psychology, might be accused of the same thing?), but it does present a plausible way to patch the holes in the Buddhist karma theory acutely felt by the North Indian scholasticists. In the last analysis, Vasubandhu will abandon it any way, since it is obviously a constructed structure (Teaching of the Three Own-Beings, 3-4). [36] A directly antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya) is any condition which helps give rise to an event which is similar to it, and which follows on it immediately (Kosa II, ad 62a-b). The motivating dispositions which arise immediately previous to a consciousness are by necessity its directly antecedent conditions, since they not only help give rise to the conscious ness, but its very nature, whereas the eye, for a visual consciousness, is only its substratum, since it does not condition the emotional nature of the consciousness. As regards a mental consciousness, its substrata are always directly antecedent conditions, though again there may be directly antecedent conditions which are not its substrata, namely the immediately preceding motivating dispositions (Kosa I, ad 44c-d). The term "directly antecedent condition" is usually reserved for cittas and motivating dispositions only, though the Bhadanta Vasumitra was of the opinion that materiality-moments could also serve as such conditions (Kosa II, ad 62a-b, La Vallee Poussin, p 301). [37] A mental consciousness cannot possibly arise where the material organs exist, but where their function does not give rise to a sensory citta. Here is a passage which demonstrates just how misleading the translation "mind" for "manas" is. By "manas", Vasubandhu means here primarily a sensory consciousness which serves as a directly antecedent condition for a mental consciousness. During the attainment of cessation, such sensory consciousnesses are by necessity absent, since they are always concomitant with feelings. [38] If in states with both citta and materiality there is a seed for a manas resting on the material organs, and another resting upon the citta-series, then manas in these states results from two separate series of seed-moments. Yet two separate series of seed-moments are never found to exist for plants which have natural seeds. A given plant always results from one seed, not two. It might be argued that Vasubandhu is here making too much of the metaphor "seed". But the positing of a capacity for producing an identical result in two different kinds of entities, is actually somewhat puzzling. The position might be saved by assuming that the capacity for engendering a citta is relegated to the series of the material organs during the attainment of cessation and is transferred back to the citta-series once the capacity is actualized. This would be a principle of "vicarious functioning", which is accepted in similar contexts by modern physiological psychology (cf. D. C. Debb, Physiological Psychology, p 210). [38a] See Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p 70. The attainment of the absence of cognitions is characterized already by Vasumitra in his Prakaranapada (Kosa II, La Vallee Poussin, p 200, note 2) as a meditation special to non-Buddhist schools, and it is in fact mentioned in the Yogasutras of Patanjali. [39] Contrary to what Vasubandhu says, and contrary to Sumatisila's best efforts to support his assertion [Karmasiddhi-tika, p 214, 1.], it seems that this theory can explain the re- emergence of the citta-series. The position is unacceptable to Vasubandhu as to Sanghabhadra, mainly because of their squeamishness toward accepting a basically non-sensate cause for a sensate result (for the materiality-series must certainly be non-sensate when there are no co-existent cittas). This is an example of the axiom discussed by Robinson in connection with conceptions of causality in Isvarakrsna, Nagarjuna, and Sankara: "The cause must be like its effects". ("Classical Indian Axiomatic", Philosophy East and West XVII, 1967, axiom 6, p 150). But the interrelationship of material and psychic entities has been recognized in Buddhist psychology since the Dhammasangani and the Jnanaprasthana, and is in several instances admitted by Vasubandhu himself (see note 17). If a sensate citta with volition can give rise to a non-sensate wind, as Vasubandhu says in Kosa IX, it is difficult to see why the process in reverse should be unacceptable to him. [40] In the Chinese translation of Hsüan-tsang, this citta supposed by the Bhadanta Vasumitra to exist within the attainment of cessation is qualified as a "subtle citta". The theory of a subtle citta existing within this attainment is alluded to also by Asanga (Mahayanasangraha I, 53). Vasubandhu gives the same passage from the Bhadanta Vasumitra's Pariprccha at Kosa II, ad 44d. The Pariprccha itself is unfortunately lost. As the Great Master Vasumitra of the Vibhasa is most often referred to as "the Bhadanta Vasumitra" (cf. Sanghabhadra, Nyayanusara, MCB V, p 91; Vibhasa, Ibid, pp 166-167), it is most likely that he is identical with the author of the Pariprccha. La Vallee Poussin (Kosa Introduction, pp XLIV-XLV) and Lamotte ("Traite de 1'Acte", n. 11) assume otherwise, but their reasoning does not seem to be based on certain grounds. On the other hand, Lin Li Kuang's thesis that there is only one ancient master Vasumitra, and that he was responsible for the theory of "mahabhumikas", motivating dispositions accompanying every citta, seems insupportable by the internal evidence of the texts involved. (L'Aide-Memoire de la Vraie Loi, pp 48-49). The following texts are attributed to a Vasumitra: the Prakaranapada (Taisho 1541, 1542), the Dhatukaya (Taisho 1540), both among the six basic texts of Sarvastivada Abhidharma; the Sangitisastra (Taisho 1549), the Pancavastuka (Taisho 1556 and 1557), the lost Pariprccha, and the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (Taisho 2031, 2032; Peking-Otani 5639, tr. A. Bareau, Journal Asiatique 1954, pp 229 ff). There is in addition a commentary on Vasubandhu's Kosa of an obviously later date. Now it is true that the Prakaranapada and the Dhatukaya contain the earliest-known mention of the "mahabhumikas", and the Sangitisastra is apparently also in consonance with the theory (cf. La Vallee Poussin, Kosa Introduction, p XLIV). But the motivating disposition list of the Pancavastuka is conspicuous by its absence of any arrangement which would fit the mahabhumika-pattern. In the first set of motivating dispositions given in the Pancavastuka, there are listed many of the moment-events which are considered mahabhumikas by the Prakaranapada. Yet within this same set there is "carelessness" (pramada) and "absence of careless ness" (apramada), which are difficult to imagine as being concomitant in any citta, not to speak of every citta (Taisho 1556, vol. 28, p 995, 3, 10-11). The term "mahabhumika” itself nowhere occurs in the Pancavastuka. It occurs only in the Pancavastuka-vibhasa, a commentary on the text by Dharmatrata (Taisho 1555, vol. 28, p 994, 2, 3-4), who seems to be inspired in his ordering of the motivating dispositions primarily by Ghosaka (cf. Abhidharmamrta, p 66, 12). The whole question of whether there are motivating dispositions separable from cittas, and the problem of whether there are mahabhumikas, were two issues on which there was much individual disagreement, as might be expected from the very nature of such an emotional topic ! It is highly unlikely that the probable originator of the mahabhumika-theory in the Prakaranapada would have so completely ignored the entire concept while discussing the motivating dispositions in the Pancavastuka. The theory of one Vasumitra is also contradicted by the fact that the Sangitisastra, though discussing the existence of past and future events, explains it in a manner quite different from the Bhadanta Vasumitra's famous theory of "states" discussed in the Vibhasa (Sangitisastra, chapt. 13, cf. La Vallee Poussin, Kosa Introduction, p XLIV), and that one Vasumitra quoted in the Vibhasa (152, 1, Ibid) (not necessarily the Bhadanta Vasumitra as assumed by La Vallee Poussin), clearly denies the existence of cittas in the attainment of cessation, which roundly contradicts the Pariprccha. Tradition is also uniform in distinguishing three Vasumitras: the author of the Prakaranapada and Dhatukaya, the Bhadanta Vasumitra of the Vibhasa, and the author of the Samaya-bhedoparacanacakra, who is identical with the Kosa commentator, and said to be a contemporary of Candrakirti (sixth century, Taranatha I, p 68, p 174). Yasomitra also gives some valuable information. He says that the Bhadanta Vasumitra wrote not only the Pariprccha, but also the Pancavastuka and other treatises. (Yasomitra, Vyakhya, ad II 44). This seems plausible, as the Pancavastuka's ordering of the motivating dispositions and the Pariprccha’s theory of a subtle citta both have at least this in common: they are inimical to the mahabhumika-theory of the Prakaranapada, Dhatukaya, and Sangitisastra. The quasi-canonical character of the Prakaranapada and the Dhatukaya for the Vibhasa indicates that these are in all probability works of an earlier era. The statements of the Bhadanta Vasumitra, on the other hand, though usually highly respected by the Vibhasa, have hardly this kind of status there. Following the internal evidence and the traditional accounts, we thus arrive at three Vasumitras: (1) the old Vasumitra, author of the Prakaranapada, of the Dhatukaya, and, in all probability, of the Sangitisastra, the probable originator of the mahabhumika-theory; (2) the Bhadanta Vasumitra, author of the Pariprccha and the Pancavastuka, opposed to the mahabhumika-theory, upholder of a. subtle citta, forger of the most accepted theory regarding past and future events, cautioner of dogmatists, one of the "Great Masters" of the Vibhasa, and, from all we can tell, a truly great-philosopher; (3) the later Vasumitra, author of a commentary on the Kosa and the Samayabhedoparacanacakra. According to traditional accounts, the four great masters Ghosaka, Buddhadeva, the Bhadanta Vasumitra, and the Bhadanta Dharmatrata were contemporaries, and all had a hand in the rough draft of that tremendous team-work compilation, the Vibhasa, at the council of the Emperor Kaniska. In spite of their philosophical differences (which become quite apparent in this treatise), Ghosaka and the Bhadanta Vasumitra apparently remained on good terms, and after the death of Kaniska, went together to live in the country of Asmaparantaka, at the invitation of the king of that country (Kosa, La Vallee Poussin, introduction, p XL1V; Abhidharmamrta introduction, p 1). By the way, the Dharmatrata who commented on the Pancavastuka was apparently an uncle of the Bhadanta Vasumitra's. He was a strict Sarvastivadin attempting a harmonization between the theories of Ghosaka and his nephew, and was also responsible for the Samyuktabhidharmasara (Tai-sho 1552), an elaboration of the work of Dharmasri. He is to be distinguished from that great maverick, the Bhadanta Dharmatrata, whom in fact he criticizes by name in the Samyuktabhidharmasara. (On this point, and on the philosophies of the two Dharmatratas, Lin Li Kuang is quite convincing, cf. L'Aide-Memoire, pp 315-342-.) [41] This is identical to the rebuttal to the Bhadanta Vasumitra's thesis given in Kosa II, ad 44d, which is there attributed to the great Ghosaka. The necessary connection of a mental consciousness with contact, feelings, and cognitions is of course an irreversible axiom to this upholder of the mahabhumikas. At Abhidharmamrta p 66, 12, Ghosaka says: "Feeling, cognition, contact, volition, mental attention, zest, mental application, memory, concentration, and discernment are the ten mahabhumikas. And for what reason is this? Because they arise together with every citta." ("Vedana sanjna sparsas cetana manaskarah chandah adhimuktih smrtih samadhih prajna ity ete dasa mahabhumika dharmah. Tat kasya hetoh? Sarvacitta-sahotpadat"). For Ghosaka, the attainment of cessation cannot be reduced to a citta of any kind, since the cessation is that of cognitions and feelings. [42] This argument is again attributed to the Bhadanta Vasumitra in the Kosa (II, ad 44 d). [43] Western translators of Buddhist texts have not usually given much attention to the various characterizations of mental and physical states traditional in Abhidharma. This is unfortunate for the whole basis of Buddhist ethical theory has been misunderstood thereby, and as a result there have been many erroneous conceptions of Buddhism: that it is anti-sensual, that it is necessarily anti-passion, that it basically considers all mundane existence evil, and so forth. Actually, a careful examination of the employment of terms used in Abhidharma ethical theory, as well as attention to their true etymological meaning, will destroy many of these misconceptions, which have arisen in part due to the incredibly arbitrary translations which have become "standard" among certain translators. As an example, "Mesa" has never meant, either in Sanskrit or for any people in direct contact with Indian masters, "defilement", as it is usually translated. The Sanskrit root "klis" means "to be afflicted, to be tormented, to suffer", and a klesa is accordingly "an affliction, pain, anguish, suffering". In Tibetan, the term "klesa" has been rendered by "nyon mongs pa", which means "misery, trouble, distress" as well as "to be afflicted", as in the expression "tsha bas nyon mongs te/" "to be molested by the heat" (Sarat Candra Das, p 489). In Chinese, it is rendered by both Paramartha and Hsüan-tsang by two characters which mean "to be troubled, vexed, grieved, irritated, distressed" (Matthews, characters no. 1789 and 4635), which together regularly mean "vexed", "vexation". Why therefore introduce into English a basically meaningless word such as "defilement," which in conjuring up all sorts of angry God, original sin, and "man is defiled" complexes, is not only etymo-logically indefensible, but also, for the twentieth century, rotten "means" (see Introduction to the Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, p 194)? There is a good word in English which is in consonance with basic life needs as well as, which goes without saying, the Four Noble Truths. Here "klesa" is translated as "affliction", and the adjective "klista" as "afflicted". We have seen Vasubandhu's list of afflictions in the Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p 92, p 94. But there is considerable variation in what mental states are included within the afflictions among Abhidharma writers, and Vasubandhu himself changes "his" "mind" on what motivating dispositions to include there. At Kosa II, ad 26:28, Vasubandhu had accepted the Vibhasa's list of klesa-mahabhumikas, those which make all other afflictions possible. These are confusion, carelessness, sloth, lack of faith, slackness, and excitedness. In The Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, Vasubandhu lists complacency, aversion, pride, ignorance, views, adherence to mere rules and rituals, doubt, envy, and selfishness as "obstructions which are afflictions" (ad II2-3 a). Later he reduces the afflictions again to the six he had accepted in A Discussion of the Five Aggregates (Thirty Verses, 11). To show the extreme examples of the disagreement in Abhidharma concerning the afflictions, Dharmatrata the Sarvastivadin in his Samyuktabhidharmasara has fifteen fundamental afflictions (Lin Li Kuang, p 49), whereas the Bhadanta Dharmatrata says that all afflictions are nothing but unbeneficial volitions, and that there are in fact no "events associated with citta" apart from feelings, cognitions, and volitions (Lin Li Kuang, p 47). To clarify some often confused concepts: Afflicted states are "bad", being suffering, but are not necessarily unbeneficial (i.e. "bad" in the sense of ethically reprehensible). There is an entire category of factors which are categorized as afflicted, but which are ethically beneficial (the kusala-sasravas), and another which is similarly afflicted, but ethically indeterminate (the nivrtavyakrtas, "obstructed but indeterminate events"). For instance, attachment may sometimes be beneficial, and doubts, remorse, and aversion, though afflicted, may have good results. Similarly, any afflicted state which has come about as a result of retribution is by necessity indeterminate ("obstructed but indeterminate"), since anything which is retribution itself carries no further retribution. (A very just credo which leaves everybody an opening for escape from suffering.) The term "afflicted" is some- what broader than that of "affliction", since an affliction is that basic kind of mental suffering which involves adjunct sufferings. Thus, the "obstructed but indeterminate" events are afflicted, but not afflictions. An affliction itself must always arise from a volition, an impulse, and a discrimination (Kosa IX, LVP, p 294; Pradhan, p 477, 1-2). Furthermore, the terms "obstructed" and "afflicted", synonymous in older Abhidharma (though in Mahayana there are obstructions which are not afflictions, see Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, ad II 1), are often equated to "connected with distress" (sasrava). However, as Yasomitra says, the last term is actually used in a much broader sense, to mean any state where basic afflictions may attach themselves. (Vyakhya ad I, 4b). Further principles: Whatever arises from a mental construction is never indeterminate, and whatever arises from an impulse is never retribution. Combining the "ethically good and bad" (beneficial-unbeneficial) with the "intrinsically good and bad" (afflicted-unafflicted), we arrive at the following divisions:
The Kosa's (II, ad 7-19; II ad 30a-b; II, ad 60-61; IV, ad 8; IV, ad 127) categorization of the twenty-two faculties into these groups will show the subtlety of the entire ethical structure:
[44] The three roots of the beneficial are, as we have seen in A Discussion of the Five Aggregates p 66, lack of greed, lack of hostility, and lack of con fusion, (cf. also Kosa II, ad 25-26 c.) They are those motivating dispositions which make all other beneficial ones possible. By necessity, they involve contact with an object-of-consciousness, and consequently involve feelings and cognitions, as motivating dispositions depend on conscious volitions to be beneficial. In other words, "lack of greed" occurring in the attainment of cessation is hot lack of greed as a root of the beneficial, because no choice can arise there, due to the absence of contact with a specific object-of-consciousness. In the absence of such choice, and in the absence of consciously- conceived roots of the beneficial, there can be no beneficial citta. This same argument is employed by Vasubandhu in his Mahayanasangrahabhasya (ad l, 54, Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tipitika vol. 112, p 282, 2-4). It is an independent argument there, not found in any developed form in Asanga's Mahayanasangraha itself. The fact that most of these independent arguments in the first chapter of this commentary show such close affinities to this treatise seems to rule against Frauwallner's "last-ditch" effort to save his fabrication of "the two great Vasubandhus" (i.e. that the Kosa, the Demonstration of Action, and the Thirty Verses are indeed by one Vasubandhu, but that only the Mahayana commentaries are by Asanga's brother). [44a] Final cessation is actually indeterminate (since nothing results from it) and is beneficial only in the sense of a beneficial goal. (See note 17a.) [45] Analogous Pali suttas: Anguttara, 40;III, 388; IV, 167. I have not been able to find a sutta where the topic is subsumed under ten questions, as it apparently is in this Dasapariprcchasutra: "The Sutra of the Ten Questions". The necessary dependence of cognitions, feelings, and motivating dispositions on contact with an object-of-consciousness is an axiom accepted in all Abhidharma, as it is in fact one of the links of "dependent origination". (See Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, ad I 10 and 11, and note 7 to that text.) [46] Afflictions presuppose the existence of feelings, cognitions, and certain other motivating dispositions, as they always arise from an impulse and a discrimination (Kosa IX, Pradhan, p 477, 1-2). Thus there can be no afflictions without contact with an object-of-consciousness. [47] Even the attainment of the absence of cognitions praised by Patanjali is beneficial, so one would think that the attainment of cessation practiced by Buddhists is even more so. [48] Only these four types of citta are traditionally regarded as unobstructed- but-indeterminate by the Vibhasa-inspired philosophies. Anything born of retribution, as well as retribution itself, is by necessity indeterminate (cf. note 43), and cittas connected with artistic or professional activity, and with postures of the body such as sitting, lying, and standing, are of course also indeterminate and unafflicted. The last category is somewhat more problematical. It seems to refer to any citta which produces pure fantasies, which beholds a magical creation, or which deals with after-images in meditation. An artist's preconception of his creation, on the other hand, seems to belong to the category of "cittas related to artistic or professional activity" (cf. Kosa II, ad 71b-72). Vasubandhu gives his argumentation a somewhat different twist in the Mahayanasangrahabhasya. He dismisses beneficial and unbeneficial cittas, and cittas related to postures, professional activity, and mental creations, in the same manner as here. But he leaves a possibility open for the "born of retribution" category. He says that it would be possible to call the attainment of cessation indeterminate qua "born of retribution", but that only the store-consciousness, of all consciousnesses, can be indeterminate in this sense (Mahayanasangrahabhasya ad I, 54, Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripitaka vol. 112, p 282, 4, 5). The arguments raised in this treatise against a retributional mental consciousness existing directly subsequent to the attainment of cessation would of course still hold. [49] The attainment of cessation is reached only after one has passed through the four basic meditations and the four other imageless attainments (See Discussion of the Five Aggregates, p 56, p 70). One of the objects of meditation being to sever afflicted cittas which are retributional, it is held that all mental retributional consciousness will be severed by the practice of these meditations. [50] The citta which occurs immediately after the attainment of cessation has been completed, must, be completely without agitation. "Utter non- agitation" is a mark of the fourth meditational state (cf. Kosa III, LVP, px216; Kosa IV, ad 46; Kosa VIII, ad 26). [51] The nine attainments of successive stages are the four basic meditations and the five imageless meditational attainments. The eight deliverances are preparative stages to the imageless attainments, plus these attainments themselves. The preparatives are listed as: "oneself containing visible forms,
one sees visibles" (rupi rupani [52] The Karmaprajnapti's solution is to make these completely concentrated meditational cittas indeterminate (cf. note 17 a). This is indeed another way out, which Vasubandhu, in spite of his apparent sympathies with the treatise, rejects here. [52a] In spite of his own great contributions to Indian logic, which are apparent in A Method for Argumentation, people who rely on dialectics only are not for Vasubandhu in a very exalted category. In his chapter on "realities" in the Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes, he recognizes arguments based on logical principles as belonging to a special kind of reality which has validity while playing a certain kind of dialecticians' game (ad III, 12). But here, as well as later in the Twenty Verses, actual insight into ultimate realities cannot be provided by any amount of reasoning alone. As a writer of treatises, Vasubandhu wishes his arguments to be based on logical principles, but he recognizes logic as more than inadequate when dealing with ultimate insights. He labels himself as a dialectician in Twenty Verses, ad 22a, and there clearly states that ultimate reality is not within the range of dialectics. Here in the Discussion for the Demonstration of Action, Vasubandhu uses the term "dialectician" almost as a jeer. This is reminiscent of the Lankavatara-sutra, where dialecticians are constantly being lambasted. A bit of the same spirit can be found also in Asanga (Mahayanasangraha X, 3 end). [53] Soma, like the Bhadanta Vasumitra, say the attainment of cessation is endowed with citta; others, like Ghosaka, say it is not. Yet they both apparently refer to the same state. Some way must be found to account for the discrepancy (cf. Abhidharmadipa II, 126, p-149). [54] Impression: impregnation: augmentation of the seeds: the initial point of the transformation of the series, particularly that induced by past volitions and other experiences. Yasomitra calls "impression" a synonym for "seed" (cf. Jaini, Dipa, p 109), but, following Asanga, we may regard it as the process of everything in past experience entering the consciousness- stream to help in its transformation (Asanga, Mahayanasangraha 1, 18). [55] This verse is ascribed to Asvaghosa by Sumatisila, Karmasiddhitika, p 217, 2. So perhaps there is something to the Chinese tradition that Asvaghosa was a proto-Yogacarin, and responsible for treatises like The Awakening of the Mahayana Faith ! [56] The Sanskrit for this verse is given by Sthiramati in his Trimsikabhasya, p. 34: "Adana-vijnana gambhira-suksmo
Vasubandhu's citation of the Sandhinirmocana-sutra is of great interest for several reasons. For one thing, it clearly contradicts Lamotte's thesis that the Discussion for the Demonstration of Action was written at a time prior to Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahayana (as do also the closing verses of the treatise, with their beautiful Mahayana transferal of merit sentiments). It leaves little doubt that Vasubandhu has been holding back on Mahayana vocabulary with the intention of leading his old Vaibhasika opponents on as far as possible with arguments they more or less have to accept, in order to finally bombard them with the conclusion that only the Yogacara conception of consciousness can completely fill the holes in the karma theory. We may regard this entire treatise as a preliminary to the more profound Yogacara insights, which is directed at the Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas who could by this means be forced to a recognition of the innate worth of Yogacara, and thus be lured to further writings of the school. In Asanga’s Mahayanasangraha, the consciousness-theory is preliminary to the teaching of the three natures and their realization, the true heart of his and Vasubandhu's Yogacara. (Mahayanasangraha I, II, and III, especially III, 9). In Vasubandhu's works, we find the same movement in the Twenty Verses, Thirty Verses, and the Teaching of the Three Own-Beings included here. The Sandhinirmocana is of course not a sutra which is accepted by the Vaibhasikas. But if the Vaibhasika can cry, "This is not authoritative scripture." Vasubandhu can counter that neither should the Vibhasa and its beloved Abhidharma "padas" be regarded as such, since they are clearly not the words of the Buddha. Orthodox Vaibhasikas, such as the Dipakara, retort that the Abhidharma serves only to interpret the sutras, and furthermore, that these Abhidharma interpretations must be taken as "higher" than any sutras which contradict them, since sutras can be conventional (aupacarika), i.e. conditioned by the exigencies of expedient methods (Dipa II, ad 138-139, pp 98-104; IV, ad 185, p 146; VIII, ad 548, p 410). The thesis that Abhidharma interpretations must be taken above sutras in contradiction with them is "old hat" in Buddhist schools that evolved Abhidharma: already in the Vibhanga, there are interpretations conformable to the sutras (suttabhajaniya) and interpretations conformable to the Abhidharma (abhidhammabhajaniya), and the latter always take precedence in case of any conflict between the two. A whole body of Buddhist teachers however objected: these are the "Sautrantikas", "those who look to the sutras as the final end of the Buddha's teaching." Vasubandhu of course belongs to this tradition at the inception of his writing career. Though his slashing at Vaibhasika categories is perhaps the most thoroughgoing one, he had predecessors in this field—certainly the Bhadanta Dharmatrata, and presumably the "mulacarya" of the Sautrantikas, Kumaralata. The question of what is to be considered canonical was raised almost at the inception of Buddhism. Because of the absence of a sacerdotal hierarchy and an initial lack of codified collections of texts, and due to the fact that many of the far-flung Buddhist communities became quite isolated from one another, divergences in doctrine naturally arose. The Buddha himself had already given means by which to test the authenticity of scripture. If a man came with something he claimed the Buddha had -said, the community was to compare it to what stood in the sutras and the Vinaya they had received, and if it did not conform to them, it was not to be accepted (Digha II, 124). In this analysis, it was the spirit rather than the letter which counted most. Thus the Nettipakarana says of this passage: "With which sutra should one confront these texts or utterances? With the Four Noble Truths. With which Vinaya should one compare them? With any Vinaya which leads one away from greed, hostility, and confusion. With which Dharma should one test them? With dependent origination."("Katamasmin sutte oraretabbani? Catusu ariyasattesu. Katamasmin vinaye samdas-sayitabbani? Ragavinaye dosavinaye mohavinaye. Katamiyam dhammatayam upanikhipitabbani? Paticcasamuppade." p 221.) Thus there came to be admitted into several ancient Canons sutras which were recognized as being post-Buddha (e.g. Majjhima II, 83 ff; Majjhima II, 57; Majjhima III, 7, and Anguttara III, 57 ff, composed under King Munda). Collections of scriptures were accepted as sutras in certain schools which never had this status in others (such as the Dhammapada and the Jatakas, challenged as late as the fifth century by teachers such as Sudinna Thera, cf. Buddhaghosa's Sumangalavilasini II, p 566, and Manorathapurani III, p 159). The case for the Vaibhasikas is somewhat weakened by the fact that the Vibhasa itself admits that there are many valid sutras which are not included in its Canon, "because they have been lost"(Vibhasa 16, p 79 b, quoted Lamotte, "La critique d'authenticite dans le Bouddhisme", India Antigua, p 218). It also says that many "false sutras", "false Vinayas" and "false Abhidharmas" have been incorporated into many Canon collections (185, p 925c. Ibid). The problem is further compounded by the Vibhasa's recognition that certain sutras are to be taken literally (nitartha), whereas others must be further interpreted (neyartha) (cf. Lamotte, "La critique d'inter-pretation dans le Bouddhisme", Annuaire de I'lnstitut de philohgie et d'his-toire orientates et slaves, IX, 1949, p 349 ff). According to traditional accounts, the Second Buddhist Council, at Vaisali, had already upheld such a distinction in 383 B.C. (Ibid, p 351). From the Mahayana side, reasons for accepting the Mahayana sutras were given by several authors. A cardinal text supporting giving their revelations, or if you will their forgeries, the status of authoritative scripture was the Adhyasrayasamcodana-sutra, which said that everything which is well-spoken can be said to be the word of the Buddha (cf. Snellgrove, BSOASXX1, 1958, pp 620-623, on this sutra's re-interpretation of the famous saying of Asoka: "E keci bhamte bhagavata Buddhena bhasite save se subhasite va.") A defense of the Mahayana sutras is given by santideva (Siksasamuccaya, B, p 15, V, p 12) and Prajnakaramati (Bodhicaryavatara-panjika IX, 43-44, V, p 205) on the perhaps not unassailable grounds that their inspiration and root-purpose is the same as those of other sutras. Prajnakaramati further says that in the face of so many dissensions even among the "Hinayanists", it is difficult to see how any one transmission of sutras can be regarded as Agama. Haribhadra in his Abhisamayalankaraloka goes one further, saying that anyone who attempts to do so must be regarded as a fool. (Tucci ed, pp 260-261; Wogihara ed, pp 400-401; Vaidya ed., p 402). [57] The residues (anusaya) are traces left by past afflictions, and thus also "proclivities" towards further unbeneficial action. The Vaibhasika, with his theory of the existence of the past and future, regards "anusaya" and "Klesa" as synonymous, a view Vasubandhu had combated already at Kosa V, ad 1 ff. (See also Jaini, "The Sautrantika Theory of Bija", and Dipa introduction, pp 103-107, and Kathavatthu XIV, 5.) [58] Any saint not liable to return to Samsara, who may however, in. contrast to the Arhat, be re-born into god-realms. [59] The Tamraparniyas are the Theravadins of Ceylon. They are only sporadically mentioned in Vaibhasika and Mahayana works. "The island Tamraparni" is a name for Ceylon at least since the days of King Iksvaku Virapurusadatta, whose Nagarjunikonda inscription mentions it by that name (c. 200 A.D.). "The Tamraparna" is however properly the Tinnevelly region of the Pandya Kingdom, which is incidentally also mentioned in the same inscription. However, at this time, Theravada seems to have been one of the dominant sects of this area as well, as both Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta claim it as their home (see Law, Buddhaghosa). [60] The bhavagravijnana, "consciousness which is the requisite of existence", is indeed a particularly Theravada conception, which goes back to the Patthana (1, 1, 3, B I, p 138; 6, 7, 81, 4, B, II, p 54; 7, 7, 23, B II, p. 121). It is a substratum underlying the six consciousnesses, which, though it is also a series of moment-events, does not undergo much change. It is not entirely subconscious, as it consists of cittas which may at time& penetrate to the sixth consciousness. However, it may exist entirely without initial mental application and subsequent discursive thought, and exists in the highest meditational attainments, as well as in dreamless sleep. It may be said to be nothing but the six consciousnesses in an unactive state. This substratum is accepted by Buddhaghosa, who assumes for it a material base (the "hadayavatthu", Visuddhimagga XIV, 458). Such a material base may itself be deduced from certain passages in the Patthana, though it does not mention the term "'hadayavatthu" itself. Yasomitra (Vyakhya ad I, 17) alludes to the full-blown theory of a substratum with a material basis, and also identifies it as a Tamraparniya doctrine. [61] A similar argument, that it was the subtlety of the store-conscious ness which prohibited the Buddha from teaching it to his early disciples, is found also in Asanga, Mahayanasangraha I, 10. As Sumatisila interprets it, the import of Vasubandhu's argument is however somewhat different. It is rather that the grouping together of events with such dissimilar characteristics would only serve to confuse the student of Buddhism. It was better to leave the store-consciousness out of the scheme for beginners (Karmasiddhitika, p 219, 1). [62] This is a typically Mahayana argument, which must however have some force for the followers of the Vibhasa, which also admits that many sutras have been lost. Vasubandhu is here conceding that the Vaibhasikas need not recognize the Sandhinirmocana as an authentic sutra. His intellectual honesty here stands in some contrast to the approach of Asanga, who attempts to make the Vaibhasikas admit the existence of the store- consciousness by claiming that it is mentioned in the Sarvastivada Canon. This he does by wringing a meaning out of an Ekottaragama passage in a most arbitrary way (Mahayanasangraha I, 13). This procedure seems to have somewhat embarrassed Sthiramati, for though he mentions this argument of Asanga's, he doesn't go into any details, and refuses to identify the sutra (Trimsikavijnaptibhasya, p 13, bottom). The Vyakhyayukti is a work of Vasubandhu's dealing with the history of the formation of the Buddhist Canon. [63] The store-consciousness conditions the evolving consciousnesses I-VI by coloring all their perceptions through its seeds; the evolving consciousnesses in turn alter the store-consciousness through the process of "impression". Asanga says that, this mutual conditioning is not only reciprocal, but simultaneous, just as in the case of the arising of a flame and the combustion of a wick (Mahayanasangraha, I, 17). [64] I do not understand how this statement of Vasubandhu's is very apposite, unless an identity "root" and "seed" is urged on the grounds that the incipient roots are the locus of the developing seeds. The Vaibhasika argument, which is Sahghabhadra's, rests on the charge that "seed" is not a very good metaphor, since the original seed no longer exists when the fruit has developed. A seed, or even a seed-series, is not adequate to ex plain the sudden retribution occurring for beneficial and unbeneficial actions. The cittas which are present at the time of the moment of retribution may themselves be beneficial, where the retribution is one for an unbeneficial act. Thus the constant relation that exists in natural seeds, that such and such a seed results in such and such a fruit, does not seem to be in evidence either (Abhidharmanyayanusara, chapt. 51, tr. LVP, MCB 4-5). [65] The theory of self criticized here is probably that of the Vaisesikas, against which Vasubandhu had already directed his supplement to the Kosa (Kosa IX). It is nonetheless interesting to compare his critique here with Sankara's argumentation in favor of an unchanging self, which is directed against the Yogacarins (Brahmasutrabhasya II, II 31). Sankara says that the Yogacarins' store-consciousness cannot serve as a substratum for impressions, because it lacks fixity of nature, as it consists only of a series of momentary events. The store-consciousness is "stable", as Asanga tells us, only in the sense that it forms a continuous, never greatly altered series (Mahayanasangraha I, 23). Thus it cannot be an abiding locus for these impressions. Unless an abiding entity pervading the three times is assumed {or else some conditioning agent which is immutable and omniscient), the processes of impression and memory cannot be explained. Here is an instance where it is difficult to say who has the better "argument. Sankara says that the lack of stability of the store-consciousness makes it inadequate as an explanation for our "sense of continuity". On the other hand, Vasubandhu's argument touches on one of the fundamental difficulties of Advaita-Vedanta: that it is impossible to relate an immutable entity to a world of phenomena constantly changing. [65a] Sumatisila tells the story as follows: "There was a man named Vrjiputraka who, upon hearing the 251 rules [of the Pratimoksa. In the Pali Patimokkha there are only 227.], abandoned them, not being able to accede to them. (The Exalted One addressed him as follows): 'Vrjiputraka, would you be able, Vrjiputraka, could you exert yourself, to train yourself well in three trainings?' He replied, 'I could exert myself, Exalted One, in three, Sugata. I could guard myself with three,' and the Exalted One replied, 'Then, Vrjiputraka, discipline yourself from time to time in the training of higher ethics (adhisila), the training of higher cittas (adhicitta), and the training of higher insight (adhiprajna'. With this teaching of the three trainings of higher ethics, etc. he summarized the 251 rules of discipline with these three trainings." [Karma-siddhi-tika, p. 220, 5. For the original sutra, see Anguttara I, 230.] [66]"Tirthankaras" is the name given by the Jains to their completely enlightened saints. Some of the Jain sutras actually do state that mental acts and intentions are only "half-acts", and do not carry as great a retribution as actual physical acts (Uvasakadasao, pp. 83, 165, 179). The Sutrakrtanga however clearly states that even an unfulfilled evil intention has its bad retribution (I, I, 2, 2'3-30). But it clearly mocks the ancient Buddhist focus on volition (which is again taken up by Vasubandhu after the Vaibhasikas had let the emphasis somewhat drop). For the Jains, any physical action, whether intentional or not, carries the same kind of retribution, and it is chiefly physical action which receives their full attention. The Sutrakrtanga has a Buddhist say: "If one thrusts a spear through the side of a granary, mistaking it for a man, or through a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it, one will be guilty of murder according to our views. If one puts a man on a spit and roasts him, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, or a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder according to our views. If anybody thrusts a spear through a man or a baby, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, puts him on the fire, and roasts him, that will be a meal fit for the Buddhas to breakfast upon" (II, VI, 26-29, Jacobi's translation). [67] Bala, was a plant commonly used in ancient Indian medicine in the preparation of oil-baths. Avinash Chunder Kaviratna, Ayurvedic physician and translator of Caraka, identifies it with Sida cordifolia (p. 281). [68] Obviously these simple acts of performance (Sumatisila's "activity which is not action") cannot be action in the Buddhist sense, i.e. action carrying retribution. As we have seen in note 43, the activity of the physical organs themselves must be completely indeterminate. |