A Method for Argumentation
(Vadavidhi) (ebook) With my warmest thanks to Vasubandhu and Stefan Anacker!
2, 3. The characteristic of a thesis is the statement of a demonstrandum, i.e. something which one attempts to demonstrate. It cannot exist without the statement of a demonstrandum, i.e. one or another among the various events which could be demonstrated. That is, an event with inferability is accepted only because there is a statement of an example with inferability, such as fire, a seed, or the non-eternality (of sounds of speech) (in various stock examples of events with inferability: a fire is inferable where there is smoke, a previously-existing seed is inferable where there is a fruit, and the non-eternality of sounds of speech is inferable from their state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort). There is no assertion which demonstrates in an argument if another (event) which can be demonstrated, among the many which could be demonstrated, is argued for, because a specified event-associate has not been asserted as having demonstrability through an event which can be demonstrated (i.e. the event-associate "fire" is related to the event "smoke" which can be demonstrated, since smoke is always concomitant with fire, but water is not, as water is not an event-associate of the event "smoke"). 4. A justification is an indication of the invariable concomitance of an event with something of such-and-such-a-kind i.e. an event's not arising if something of such-and-such-a-kind does not exist. Something of such-and-such-a-kind in a demonstrandum is, for example, non-eternality, etc., in reference to an object like sounds of speech. There must thus be an indication of some event which does not exist unless concomitant with another, i.e. if there is a cessation of one, the other cannot exist. A justification exists only when there is an indication of an invariable concomitance of an event-associate with something of such-and-such-a-kind, for example, the invariable concomitance of a state-of-arising-due-to-an-effort with non-eternality, or of smoke with fire. If it is a statement of such a kind, "because of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort", it is a justification (i.e. in the argument "Sounds of speech are non-eternal, because of their state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort", "because of their state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort" is a justification, because of the invariable concomitance of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort with non-eternality). There is no justification where there is no such indication of an invariable concomitance, for instance, when one says, "Sound is non-eternal, because of its perceptibility by the eye". 5. The exemplification is the specific indication of the connection of the two (event and event-associate) when one is attempting to demonstrate something. The "connection" is the in variable concomitance of the demonstrandum and the demonstrator, that is, the non-arising of the demonstrator when the demonstrandum does not exist. That through which the connection, i.e. invariable concomitance, of the two is specifically mentioned, is called "the exemplification". It must take the form of a specific parallel example, plus the statement of an invariable concomitance. Thus, in the inference regarding sounds of speech, a specific parallel example would be "like a pot" ("Sounds of speech are non-eternal, because of their state-of-arising-due-to-an-effort, like a pot"), and the statement of the invariable concomitance would be "Whatever has come about through an effort is not eternal." 6, 7. Among pseudo-justifications, there are (1) those which are not demonstrated, (2) those which are not sufficiently certain, and (3) those which incur a self-contradiction. Among these, those which are not demonstrated are those where the characteristics stated in the exemplification do not exist. For example, if it is said, "Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by the eye", this is an argument which is not demonstrated; if it is said, "It is eternal, because it is without a body", this is an argument which is not sufficiently certain. An example of one which incurs self-contradiction for a Vaisesika is: "It is not eternal, because it is perceived through the senses"; for a Sankhya: "The effect is contained in the cause, because it comes to be (through the cause)."[2] 8. There is a flaw in the exemplification if it exists with an undemonstrated object, for instance, if it is stated that "Sound is eternal, because of its non-tangibility, like a cognition, not like a pot." He object which is to be demonstrated, and the demonstrator, is not demonstrated by stating the negative parallel example "like a pot". 9. A direct perception is a consciousness through the object itself only. When a consciousness arises only on account of the object-of-sense after which it is designated, and not through anything else, then this cognition is direct perception, for example, cognitions of visibles, etc., or cognitions of pleasure, etc. With this definition, false cognitions are rejected, for example the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver. For this cognition is designated by "silver" as a "silver-cognition", but does not arise on account of silver, but rather is evoked through mother-of-pearl. A conventional cognition is also rejected by this definition. For such a cognition is designated as "a cognition of pots" etc., but does not arise on account of pots which are really existing, but rather only through juxtapositions of visibles, etc., which are interpreted as "pots",[3] Pots themselves can in no way give rise to this cognition, because of their conventionality, and their thus not being in a state-of-being-a-cause. Finally, cognition through inference is also rejected by this definition, because such a cognition occurs, for instance, through the cognition of smoke and the memory of its invariable concomitance with fire, but not through the fire itself. That through which exclusively the cognition arises, and does not exist unless it arises, is regarded as an "object in this passage.[4] 10. Knowledge which arises when an invariably concomitant object is observed, is inference. "Invariable concomitance" means that one object cannot arise unless the other one exists, as for example, fire and smoke. The non-observation of a possibility of one's arising without the other is inference, and it is through this invariable concomitance that something may be inferred. Accordingly, the cognition of an object which may be inferred is the result of an inference. By this definition, false cognitions are rejected. Knowledge through inference can be specified as an observation coming when the means-of- evidence is directly observed, and the invariable concomitance between it and what can be inferred is remembered. One (the event in the demonstrandum) does not occur unless something else (the means-of-evidence) is directly known. Otherwise, there is no inference. 11. Flaws exist in a rejoinder when it is reversed, incorrect, or contradictory. A rejoinder is reversed when in the anterior thesis[5], the formulation of the argument is separate from the characteristic of a true justification. An incorrect rejoinder is any that is false, i.e. when the object does not exist in the manner in which the thesis states that it does. A contradictory rejoinder in one that cannot co-exist with its own thesis. 12. Among: these, the reversed etc., include spurious replies based on identity of the objects, complete unrelatedness of the objects, various alternatives, non-differentiation, lack of a justification, excess, reduction, direct apprehension (irrelevant to the inference), doubts, non-utterance, difference of effect, etc., (types of spurious replies as categorized by the Nyaya-sutra) [Nyaya-sutra V, 1, 1.]. 13. Among these, four [Spurious replies based on complete unrelatedness of objects, direct apprehension irrelevant to the inference, non-utterance, and non-differentiation.] are reversed, because there is an uncertain similarity adduced in what is to be inferred through a justification which is certain. Just as the reversed is uncertain as regards that which should be certain, so the contradictory is impossible because the objects in the argument cannot co exist. It is possible to show that a rejoinder based on various alternatives is really one which is incorrect, because something is stated to be uncertain through something that is really certain and true. 14. (When one argues through unrelatedness where related- ness occurs, this is a case where, to follow the older categorization [Nyaya-bhasya, ad V, 1, 2.], one is arguing from unrelatedness of objects.) Assuming that the thesis is as follows: "Sound of speech is not eternal, because of its state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort, like a pot", the maker of such a spurious reply may say the following: "Though in this case, the relatedness alleged by you exists, yet of these two, only a pot is fireable and perceptible by the eye, whereas sound is not. Therefore the pot is non-eternal because of its perceptibility by the eye, and its fireability, whereas the same is not the case with sounds of speech. On the other hand, of these two only sound is eternal on account of non-perceptibility by the eye, etc., whereas the pot is not." Such a rejoinder is reversed. For fireability is of insufficient strength to demonstrate non-eternality. One does not observe a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort without non-eternality; thus the inference is demonstrated in the same way as that relating to fire and smoke. Where fireability does not exist, as in the case of wind produced by a fan, etc., there still does not exist an object without observable non-eternality. Therefore, this reply is reversed. Even with audibility, sounds of speech, are observed where a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort is also observed to occur. Thus this inference based on non-audibility is absurd, as it is refuted by the power of observation. It can be observed that a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort invariably exists with non-eternality, so through what power is the inference for sound's non-eternality refuted? It simply isn't. Therefore, this reply is reversed. The opponent is arguing with two-fold uncertainty. This follows from our explanation of the occurrence of his justification together with an unrelated topic, though he is arguing from a relatedness of the objects, or, secondly, from our indication that if a demonstrandum is refuted because of unrelatedness of objects, the justification adduced by us is without a refutation. If one argues from a relatedness with fireability, which is certain, towards an uncertainty, though it is true that the relatedness alleged occurs, yet there is no connection in the anterior thesis' rejoinder when it is stated that as without fire-ability, etc., non-eternality is not observed, it does not exist in the case of sounds of speech. The statement proceeds from a relatedness of objects which does not exist. Because it has been indicated that the statement of the opponent for the eternality of sound because of its non-fireability, etc., is without a justification, and thus without a true demonstrandum, this reply is uncertain, as non-fireability is not concurrent with the demonstrandum eternality, since even where fireability does not occur, eternality still does not necessarily exist. Thus this reply is insufficiently certain. When one is attempting to infer eternality from a total unrelatedness of objects to a relatedness, as when eternality is argued solely through audibility, one may reply that it is certainly not observed that non-audibility occurs necessarily with non-eternality. Thus this reply is reversed (Discussion of spurious replies based on non-differentiation, i.e. where a differentiation which should be taken note of is simply ignored in order to adduce a thesis.[Nyaya-sutra V, 1, 23; Nyaya-bhasya ad V, 1, 23; Nyaya-kosa, p 95. Example: "If sounds of speech are non-eternal because of their state-of-arising-due-to-an-effort, and this non-eternality of sounds of speech is argued through their similarity with non-eternal pots, etc., then, because of their inferability, all objects would be non-eternal." (Nyaya-kosa's example from the Nilakanthi, 9, 44.)] The lost portion probably had as its aim the inclusion of this spurious type within the "reversed" category.) 15. A reply proceeding from excess and reduction [Nyaya-bhasya, ad V, 1, 4.] is reversed. For example, when a justification is brought up with its exemplification, and one says, for example, "Sounds of speech are not eternal, because they have arisen due to an effort", and the reply is given, for example, in this manner: "If the justification demonstrates that the demonstrandum is associated with a certain event, then it follows that it is not different from the demonstrandum, like the water of a stream which has entered the ocean. An association with an event is not possible if the object associated with it is not obtained. But if the demonstrandum is obtained, what9 purpose can the justification possibly have? On the other hand, if it is not associated with the event of the demonstrandum, then it is not different from those objects which are not justifications, and thus is not a justification itself." To this anterior thesis, it may be replied as follows: The opponent is speaking of a cause-as-condition-for-a-cognition. But instead of recognizing this, he speaks of it as if it were a material cause, and attempts to refute the inference in this way.[6] He is thus making a vain assertion, because he is attempting to argue against something other than a cause-as-condition-for-a-cognition. Thus this reply is reversed. 16. A justification through a direct apprehension (irrelevant to the inference) [Nyaya-sutra V, 1, 27.] in the opponent's demonstrandum is a spurious reply based on direct apprehension. For instance, in the case already given, where the non-eternality of sounds of speech is inferred through their state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort, the adversary may reply: "This is no justification for non-eternality, because in the case of a flash of lightning, etc., non-eternality is demonstrated through other means-of-cognition, such as direct perception, etc., (and there is no state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort involved). There is no justification where one object exists even where the other (supposedly invariably concomitant one) doesn't." Others formulate this in a different manner: "There is no justification for non-eternality here, because there is no logical pervasion, just as in the case of the necessity of conscious activity for trees because of their sleeping at night, which occurs only for sirlfa-trees."[7] To this it may be replied as follows: In reply to the statement that non-eternality is demonstrated through a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort itself only, the opponent is saying: "There is no justification for non-eternality, and there is no logical pervasion, either, so we are made happy." But this reply is reversed. Because it is a vain assertion resting on the assumption that we are claiming that something is non-eternal only Because of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort, whereas what we are claiming is that something is non-eternal because of a state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort itself only. Thus this reply is reversed (discussion of reversal through doubt, where the means-of-evidence is itself doubtful) [cf. Nyaya-sutra V, 1, 14.] 17. When one assumes that since a justification does not exist before its utterance, the demonstrandum also must not exist, this is a case of a reply based on non-utterance.[This is similar to the spurious argument based on not-having-arisen {anutpatti-sama) in the Nyaya-sutra and Nyaya-bhasya. (See Nyaya-sutra and bhasya V, 1, 32, and Vada-vidhi 23.)] For example, the maker of such a spurious reply may say to this same argument that sounds of speech are non-eternal because they arise due to an effort: "Since the justification does not exist prior to its apprehension and utterance, it follows that the demonstrandum also does not exist. Thus, since sounds of speech are said to be non-eternal because they have arisen due to an effort, it follows that, because the justification does not exist prior to its utterance, the sound is not yet non-eternal. Thus it must be eternal prior to the utterance of the justification. But once it is eternal, how can it become non-eternal?" To this it may be replied as follows: This reply is reversed. We adduce the justification as something which brings about a cognition, but not as something which brings about a cessation. This maker of a spurious reply is however attempting to refute us on the grounds that the justification itself is supposed to bring about a cessation. Thus this reply is reversed. 18. When one attempts to show that the demonstrandum is not demonstrated on account of a minimal difference in effect [Nyaya-sutra, Nyaya-bhasya, V, 1, 37.], this is a reply based on difference of effect. When for example the thesis has been set up as follows: "Sounds of speech are non-eternal, because they are an effect, like a pot", the adversary may reply as follows: "The pot is non-eternal because of being an effect of a different sort, so how does this apply to sounds of speech?" To this it may be replied as follows: We are claiming that every effect in general is non-eternal, so the difference from the state-of-effect of a pot is irrelevant. Thus this reply is reversed. 19. The incorrect includes spurious replies based on unwarranted overextension of principles [Ibid V, 1, 9-10.] and on mere conjecture.[Ibid V, 1, 21] 20. When it is said that sounds of speech are non-eternal be cause of their state-of-possessing-a-cause-by-obvious-means-of- evidence, just like a pot, a maker of a spurious reply might say, "What is your justification for stating that the pot itself is non- eternal?" To this it may be replied as follows: Why is there no justification simply because it has not been related to the demonstrandum, when the object in the parallel example can be directly observed to be concomitant with the event in the demonstrandum? For it can be directly observed by you yourselves, too, that the arising of a pot occurs with the means-of-evidence of a cause. Thus this reply is unreal. 21. (Spurious replies based on conjecture [Nyaya-sutra, Nyaya-bhasya V, 1, 21.] may be reduced to unreal replies, also.) For instance, when it is argued that the self does not exist, because it cannot be apprehended, just like the son of a barren woman, the maker of such a spurious reply may respond as follows: "Then the self-evident supposition is incurred, that everything which is directly perceived must exist. But there are objects which though they are directly perceived do not exist, such as the circle which is seen when a torch is hurled in an arc." To this it may be replied: It is being assumed that there is existence for everything that is directly perceived, which is a vain assertion. (What is being argued here is that that which is not directly perceived, and which cannot be inferred, does not exist.) Thus this reply is unreal. 22. The contradictory includes spurious replies based on not- having-arisen, on eternality, etc. 23. A reply made on the grounds of not-having-arisen [Ibid. V, 1, 12.] occurs when one assumes that before its coming into existence, the justification cannot have existed, and consequently the demonstrandum also cannot exist. For example, when it is being argued that sounds of speech are non-eternal because they have arisen through an effort, the maker of such a spurious reply might say: "If it is non-eternal, because it has arisen due to an effort, then prior to its arising it has not arisen due to an effort, and consequently it is eternal." To this it may be replied: Before its arising, the sound does not exist. And to maintain that it does not exist and is eternal, is a contradiction, because non-existence and eternality cannot co-exist. Thus this reply is contradictory. The same reply is also reversed on grounds of resting on a conjecture. For the adversary is saying: "Since before the arising of the -sound its state-of-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort does not exist, it follows that it has not arisen due to an effort, and thus is eternal, because of its state-of-not-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort." To this it may be replied as follows: There is no certainty that something is eternal because of its state-of-not-arising-immediately-upon-an-effort. For there are three possibilities here: Some things are eternal, like space, etc. And some things are non-eternal, such as flashes of lightning, etc. And some other things do not exist, like a sky-flower, etc. Thus this reply is reversed. 24. When one argues from an object's invariable association with non-eternality to eternality, then we have a spurious reply based on eternality. [Nyaya-sutra and Nyaya-bhasya, V, 1, 32.] In this case the adversary replies to the assertion that sounds of speech are non-eternal as follows: "In that case, sounds of speech are eternal, because they are eternally connected with non-eternality, and its unchanging nature is thus eternal." To this it may be replied as follows: This is a contradiction. And why is this? Because something non-eternal is being called "eternal". Thus this reply is contradictory.
[1] Throughout this translation, "object" means "an object of sense or understanding". [2] According to the Vaiseiskas, simple entities are eternal, though they may be perceived by the senses. According to Sankhya, effects pre-exist in their causes, and they are not a new creation, but only an explicit manifestation of that which is implicitly contained in the material cause. So the Sankhya may assert the first half of the statement given, but not the second, since the effect strictly speaking does not come about because of the cause. Inconsistency with one's own unstated thesis is not an extralogical ground for rejecting an argument in Vasubandhu's method. [3] According to the provisional theory most beloved to Vasubandhu, what we normally perceive as entities are in no way really entities; so, for instance, "pots" is a mere conventional expression for an interdependent complex with no unifying entity entering in. [4] The object is that without which a cognition cannot arise. This definition does not say anything about the ontological status of the "object''. It only says that without that which is designated as an "object", there is no cognition. [5]"Anterior thesis" is the usual Indian scholastic term for an opponent's thesis, since this is always presented first. [6] Vasubandhu makes a clear contrast between those events which serve as conditions for a consciousness-moment inasmuch as they are its objects-of-consciousness, and those which are its truly generative conditions, (cf. Kosa V, id 27), [7] The sirisa tree, Acacia speciosa Willd., or Acacia sirissa Buch., has leaves which close at night. Thus it is said to "sleep". The objector is saying that just as one cannot infer the necessity of conscious activity for trees from the sole example of the sirisas's sleeping, one cannot infer the non-eternality of sounds of speech from their state-of-arising-immediately- upon-an-effort, because a flash of lightning is non-eternal and there is no effort involved. |